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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial reporting quality is a central issue in the capital markets. As a means to 
improve the quality of financial reporting, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) section 302, 
“Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports,” requires the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of publicly traded firms to certify the 
appropriateness and fairness of financial reports.1 This requirement and the increasingly 
complex reporting environment shaped by SOX have put great pressures on the CFO as 
the supervisor of corporate financial reporting, and have led to a significant increase in 
CFO turnover after SOX.2 With the responsibilities of the CFO in financial reporting 
oversight having increased under SOX,3 audit committees are likely to think that CFOs 
with financial expertise (e.g. professional certification, financial background and 
experience) are more desirable and better able to carry out the tasks of current CFOs:4  
                                                 
1
 Research finds that managers’ incentives are one determinant of financial reporting quality (e.g. Healy 
(1985) for CEO incentives; Geiger and North (2006) for CFO incentives). The certification requirement is 
intended to curb managerial opportunistic behavior by holding them personally responsible for their 
company’s financial reports.  
2
 The pressures also come from the increased amount of time and resources necessary for SOX compliance 
and from the increased costs of misreporting (such as criminal penalties for accounting fraud). A report in 
Business Wire on May 22, 2006 indicates that CFO turnover of Fortune 500 companies has increased from 
13 percent in 2003 to 16 percent in 2004 and to 19 percent in 2005 (in Business Wire 2006; Leone 2006).  
3
 The increase in the responsibilities and risks associated with a CFO position is followed by an increase in 
CFO compensation incremental to other executives (Wang 2007). 
4
 The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999, p. 25) defines financial expertise as related to past employment 
experience in accounting, professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or 
background which results in the individual’s financial sophistication. 
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financial expertise has become more essential for competent CFOs and with financial 
expertise, CFOs potentially have a greater ability to improve the quality of financial 
reporting.5 
 By contrast, a CFO’s lack of financial expertise, especially with respect to 
accounting knowledge, potentially increases the likelihood of errors in his/her reporting 
judgments, reducing financial reporting quality. Lynn E. Turner, a former chief 
accountant of the Security and Exchange Comission (the SEC), in his letter to the SEC in 
2005, expresses his concerns about the lack of understanding of accounting principles by 
many financial executives:6 
 
“A concern we have as users of financial statements, is the number of times we have 
spoken with CFOs or controllers who have expressed that they do not have sufficient 
expertise to properly prepare the financial statements and fulfill the basic requirements 
of the securities laws.” p. 9. 
  
As CFOs are expected to oversee corporate financial reporting processes, CFO 
financial expertise potentially plays a significant role in shaping the quality of financial 
reporting in general, and the quality of earnings in particular. However, empirical 
evidence for the association between the quality of financial reporting and CFO financial 
expertise is surprisingly scarce. Most studies of financial expertise focus on audit 
committee financial expertise (e.g. Abbott et al. 2004, Davidson et al. 2004, DeFond et 
al. 2005, Krishnan 2005, Zhang et al. 2007), presumably triggered by the recent 
                                                 
5
 The importance of accounting qualification as one criterion for competent CFOs has triggered some 
concerned individuals to request that the SEC Chairman establish a rule to require CFOs of public 
companies to have a CPA or CMA credential (CPA Journal 1996).   
6
 The full letter from Lynn E. Turner may be viewed at the following SEC website: 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/soxcomp/soxcomp-turner.pdf.  
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regulatory requirement to disclose the presence of financial experts on audit committees. 
Ge et al. (2008) examine the effects of CFO styles on financial reporting strategies, which 
are categorized into earnings-related strategies and disclosure-related strategies. They 
identify CFO turnovers and test whether the same CFO tends to take the same reporting 
strategies when he or she becomes a CFO of a different company (i.e. CFO fixed effect). 
Their study finds that CFOs’ individual characteristics have a significant influence on 
financial reporting decisions – the adjusted R-squares increased even after controlling for 
CEO fixed effects. They also find that older CFOs are usually more conservative while 
those with undergraduate degrees tend to be more aggressive in financial reporting 
decisions. Some independent variables in Ge et al. are similar to those in this study. 
However, this study uses a different set of dependent variables and samples. Further, the 
focus of this study is on the effects of CFO financial expertise on earning quality while 
their study focuses on CFO fixed effects on financial reporting practices. Another recent 
study by Matsunaga and Yeung (2008) examines whether the financial experience of a 
CEO improves financial reporting quality, where financial experience is defined as 
having previously served as a CFO. They find that financial experience is associated with 
more income-decreasing accruals (i.e. more conservative earnings). However, the study 
does not address the role of CFO financial expertise in financial reporting. Therefore, 
whether or not the presence of a CFO with financial expertise improves the quality of 
earnings remains an open question. 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether there are systematic differences 
in the quality of earnings associated with having a CFO with financial expertise. On the 
effect of CFO financial expertise on reporting quality, Aier et al. (2005) find that the 
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presence of a CFO with financial expertise is associated with a lower probability of 
financial restatement. However, Aier et al. do not specifically examine whether CFO 
financial expertise improves the quality of earnings. CFO financial expertise potentially 
improves earnings quality through better judgments and helps CFOs produce more 
accurate accounting estimates (McNichols 2002, p. 61) and thus reduces noise in earnings 
because earnings numbers are a product of estimations involving judgments. Further, in 
this dramatically changing reporting environment, having financial executives with 
sufficient accounting and financial expertise is preferable, as they potentially know better 
how to comply with accounting standards and how to guard the integrity and quality of 
accounting numbers.7 
Examining whether CFO financial expertise affects the quality of earnings is 
important for several reasons. First, there has been evidence in the years following SOX 
that more firms hire CFOs with financial expertise. O’Sullivan (2004) finds that many 
firms are seeking financial executives with a better understanding of accounting. This 
claim is supported in a study by Spencer Stuart, an executive search consulting firm, 
which finds that between 2003 and 2005, the proportion of financial executives with a 
CPA designation among Fortune 1000 firms increased from 20 percent to 35 percent 
(Durfee 2005). Bralver et al. (2006), in another study, observed a greater share of CPA 
and MBA credentials for CFO positions, suggesting an increasing demand for CFOs with 
more financial expertise. One possible explanation of the trend is that it indicates the 
eagerness of audit committees to have CFOs who understand how to guard the integrity 
of financial reporting and minimize the possibility of misreporting. Second, despite the 
                                                 
7
 A survey conducted in Australia revealed that 81 percent of the public would have more confidence if the 
CFO of the company has an accounting qualification (Australian CPA 2003). 
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fact that CFOs have different levels of financial expertise across firms, prior research 
(e.g. Geiger and North 2006) implicitly assumes that CFOs have similar influence on the 
quality of earnings. The role of financial expertise becomes more critical under the 
complex reporting environment following SOX. In addition to increased regulatory 
requirements, the growing complexity in financial transactions, especially in the last 
decade, is likely to contribute to a greater need for CFOs with financial expertise. In 
complex tasks, the presence of expertise has a higher probability to make a difference 
(Abdolmohammadi & Wright 1987). Teets (2002) posits that the quality of earnings 
depends upon the existing accounting standards and managerial accounting choices and 
judgments. Little is known about the role of financial expertise in accounting method 
choices and the quality of experts’ judgments in financial reporting. This study helps fill 
the gap by examining whether the presence of a CFO with financial expertise affects the 
quality of financial reporting. 
CFO financial expertise potentially affects the attributes of accounting numbers as 
the input for investors’ valuation processes. This study focuses on the financial expertise 
of CFOs for the following reasons. First, although firms may have lower-level accounting 
staff with expertise, the staff is less likely to have the authority to select accounting 
methods. Final reporting decisions, which determine reporting quality, still lie with the 
CFOs and their supervisor. Second, the current rules require CFOs to certify financial 
reports prior to their submission, making them the most responsible individuals for the 
quality of the reports and for any possible accounting errors and fraud. This suggests that 
the financial expertise of a CFO potentially has stronger effects on reporting quality than 
does the expertise of other accounting staff in the firm.  
 6
Another purpose of the study is to examine whether the association between CFO 
financial expertise and earnings quality can be explained by existing theories. The effects 
of CFO financial expertise on financial reporting may be viewed from two different 
perspectives: the demand hypothesis and the opportunistic behavior hypothesis.8 
Following a series of accounting scandals (e.g. Worldcom, Enron, Tyco, among others) 
that shattered investor confidence, capital market participants and regulators demanded 
higher quality financial reporting. The government responded by enacting SOX to 
enforce accurate and reliable financial reporting and to restore investor confidence. SOX 
has forced financial executives to pay more attention to details of financial reporting and 
spend more time on compliance with new regulations. Under the demand hypothesis, 
more firms hire CFOs with financial expertise as expertise is necessary to meet investor 
and regulatory demands for higher reporting quality. Financial expertise potentially 
benefits investors through accounting numbers that better reflect the value of the firm, 
and through higher compliance with reporting standards and rules. On the other hand, 
under the opportunistic behavior hypothesis, when more financial expertise is placed in 
the hands of managers with self-serving behavior, it potentially widens the information 
asymmetry and can be exploited to orchestrate earnings management and conceal it from 
principals, and thus reduce earnings quality. In the current environment characterized by 
stronger corporate governance structures, increased costs of misreporting, and investors’ 
increased awareness of financial reporting quality, earnings management may require a 
higher degree of sophistication on the part of managers. Motivated by increasing 
demands for earnings quality and for CFOs with financial expertise following SOX, this 
                                                 
8
 Givoly et al. (2007) use these hypotheses to predict the association between public ownership and 
earnings quality.  
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study investigates whether the recent trend towards hiring CFOs with more financial 
expertise supports or hinders earnings quality.  
The descriptive statistics reveal a pattern in how firms of different sizes hire their 
CFO. The study provides evidence that large firms are more likely to hire CFOs with an 
advanced degree in business or an MBA degree, while small firms are more likely to hire 
those with a CPA designation. Being a CFO of a large, more complex firm presumably 
requires a broader set of business knowledge and skills, which could be obtained through 
graduate education in business. Hiring a CFO with an MBA degree meets this 
requirement. The data show that recently appointed CFOs are more likely to hold a CPA 
or to have an MBA degree, which might indicate an increase in demand for CFOs with 
financial reporting expertise. Further, CFOs with a CPA are relatively younger compared 
to those with an advanced degree in business.  
This study contributes to the accounting literature by providing direct evidence 
related to the effects of CFOs with financial expertise on the quality of reported earnings, 
and extends the discussions on the association between the characteristics of financial 
executives and financial reporting quality (such as those by Aier et al. 2005, Li et al. 
2008, Matsunaga and Yeung 2008, and Ge et al. 2008). Using cross-sectional data, this 
study finds that CFO financial expertise, at least partially, affects the attributes of 
earnings. The results show that CPA improves CFOs’ ability to reduce errors in accrual 
estimations, and thus improve accruals quality, as they gain longer CFO experience. 
Firms whose CFO holds a CPA license are also associated with higher earnings 
persistence. Further tests indicate that the variables MBA, CFO experience, and CFO age 
are associated with more conservative earnings while CPA is associated with less 
 8
conservative earnings. Lastly, this study presents evidence that investors react more 
strongly to earnings when the financial reports are certified by a CFO with a CPA and 
less strongly when certified by a CFO with an advanced degree in business.  
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
literature on earnings quality and financial expertise and presents the hypotheses. Chapter 
3 discusses research methodologies used to test the hypotheses. Chapter 4 provides the 
results including the descriptive statistics and the hypothesis testing, and Chapter 5 
summarizes the dissertation.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES  
 
 
2.1. The role of financial expertise in financial reporting 
The importance of financial expertise under SOX has increased as implied in the 
requirement to have a financial expert on the board of directors and the certification of 
financial statements by the CEO/CFO. The SEC requirement of having at least one 
member with financial expertise in audit committees is consistent with the self-serving 
view of managerial behavior in that the presence of a board member with expertise 
increases the ability of boards of directors to observe actions taken by management (i.e. 
monitoring) and to interpret reports on the outcome of the actions, and thus reduces 
information asymmetry. The roles of audit committee financial expertise in financial 
reporting have been studied extensively (see e.g. Davidson et al. 2004 and DeFond et al. 
2005, among others) and are discussed in the next section.  
 
2.1.1. Audit committee financial expertise 
 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) established a blue ribbon committee (BRC) in September 
1998 to make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of audit committees in  
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overseeing corporate financial reporting practices. The committee was created to respond 
to SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt’s concerns about the adequacy of the oversight of the 
audit process by boards of directors.9 One of the BRC’s recommendations points out the 
necessity to require firms with a market capitalization above $200 million to have at least 
three members on the audit committee, each of whom is financially literate (Blue Ribbon 
Committee 1999).10  
A large number of corporate governance studies on audit committees support the 
recommendations. Such studies show empirically that favorable audit committee 
characteristics (e.g. size, independence, and expertise) reduce the probability of earnings 
management (Klein 2002), are negatively associated with accounting restatement (Abbott 
et al. 2004), are positively associated with higher external audit fees (a proxy for higher 
audit quality) (Carcello et al. 2002), are more effective in shielding auditors from 
dismissal following the issuance of new going-concern reports (Carcello and Neal 2003), 
are less likely to be associated with internal control problems (Krishnan 2005), and 
improve the perceived quality of financial reporting (Felo et al. 2003). McDaniel et al. 
(2002) examine whether judgments by financial experts in evaluating financial reporting 
quality are different from those by financial literates.11 The study shows that in evaluating 
financial reporting quality, financial experts are more likely to make assessments based 
on the characteristics described in Statement of Financial Accounting Concept No. 2 (e.g. 
relevance) than are financial literates.  
                                                 
9
 The concerns were documented in Levitt (1998).  
10
 The Blue Ribbon Committee defines financial literacy as the ability to read and understand basic 
financial statements (BRC 1999, p. 26). Thus, a financial literate is an individual who has the ability to read 
and understand basic financial statements.  
11
 The definition of financial expertise in McDaniel et al. (2002) follows that of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee (1999, p. 25). See footnote no. 4.   
 11
 In line with the BRC recommendations, SOX requires public firms to disclose the 
presence of financial experts on audit committees and if there are none, explain why 
not.12 Motivated by SOX, DeFond et al. (2005) find that the appointment of audit 
committee members with financial expertise is valued by investors. Interestingly, a 
significant market reaction is observed when financial expertise is defined narrowly to 
include only accounting expertise. An earlier study by McMullen and Raghunandan 
(1996) suggests that having at least one CPA on the audit committee is associated with a 
significantly lower probability of accounting problems, as indicated by SEC enforcement 
actions or material restatement of quarterly earnings. Audit committee members with 
financial expertise may be perceived as having a better set of skills to guard the quality 
and integrity of financial reports. Xie et al. (2003) find that board and audit committee 
members with financial backgrounds are associated with a lower probability of earnings 
management. In another study, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that having an 
independent financial expert on the audit committee is associated with a lower probability 
of restatement.  
 
2.1.2. Financial expertise of CFOs 
CFO financial expertise potentially affects the quality of financial reporting. 
There are at least two different views on the importance of accounting expertise for the 
CFO position. The first view suggests that accounting expertise is decreasing in 
                                                 
12
 In its final version, the SEC defines an audit committee financial expert as a person who a) understands 
GAAP and financial statements, b) is able to assess the general application of GAAP in connection with the 
accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves, c) has experience in preparing, auditing, analyzing or 
evaluating financial statements, d) understands internal controls and procedures for financial reporting, and 
e) understands the functions of audit committees (SEC 2003).  
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relevance. The roles of CFOs have expanded to include a broader set of strategic tasks 
such as chief information officer, partner to the CEO, or head of investor relations. 
Consequently, the emphasis on the role of a CFO as an accounting officer has 
diminished, resulting in a reduced importance for basic accounting knowledge and 
accounting qualifications. In the 1980s, most CFOs had an accounting qualification 
(Bedell 2000). By the 1990s and beyond, however, a growing number of CFOs have 
lacked an accounting background due to a shift in emphasis towards CFOs’ strategic 
skills (Heffes and Millman 2005). On July 6, 2002, The Economist reported that only 20 
percent of CFOs at Fortune 500 companies were CPAs (Economist 2002). Aier et al. 
(2005) conjecture that the sharp increase in accounting restatements may be associated 
with these changes in the background of CFOs.  
 The second view sees accounting expertise as becoming increasingly fundamental 
for a CFO position. Following the passage of SOX, many firms looking for a new CFO 
reportedly preferred candidates with a CPA designation (O’Sullivan 2004). The presence 
of a CFO with financial expertise should add confidence to top management and to 
investors, especially in the current environment, which is characterized by growing 
public expectations as to the quality of financial reporting and by increased potential 
costs of misreporting. Pressure from regulators and boards of directors regarding the 
quality of accounting numbers has intensified, and CFOs’ ignorance of basic accounting 
models potentially brings serious legal consequences.  
 Supporting the importance of financial expertise for a CFO position is the claim 
that financial transactions have become increasingly complex in recent years (Liesman 
2002). The complexity of business transactions potentially adds noise to management’s 
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accounting forecasts and increases the magnitude of errors in estimates (Palepu et al. 
2000), and thus reduces the quality of financial reporting.  Accounting treatments for 
some transactions have not yet been prescribed by accounting standards (Ng 2004). The 
role of a CFO with financial expertise is to grasp the concept underlying complex 
transactions and to apply the most appropriate choices in order to generate the accounting 
numbers that best represent the effects of the transactions on the company’s wealth, or to 
supervise a controller with this expertise.  
 
2.2. The demand hypothesis and the opportunistic behavior hypothesis 
This study investigates the roles of financial executives with expertise on earnings 
quality. Predictions of the association between financial expertise and earnings quality 
are developed based on the demand hypothesis and the opportunistic behavior hypothesis.  
 
2.2.1 Financial expertise and the demand hypothesis 
SOX represents a manifestation of a public demand for better financial reporting 
quality. Previous studies document that firms respond to market demands for earnings 
quality. On the effect of SOX, Lobo and Zhou (2006) show that following the 
requirement for CEO/CFO certification, there is an increase in conservatism in financial 
reporting, through lower discretionary accruals and quicker recognition of losses than 
gains. Using UK firms, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) find that even though private and 
public firms face roughly equivalent regulations on auditing, accounting standards, and 
taxes, financial reporting of public companies is of higher quality due to greater market 
demand for quality. Similar results are documented by Burghstahler et al. (2006) in the 
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European Union. They find that higher demand promotes better reporting quality. This is 
consistent with the view that financial reporting is the means to communicate and to 
resolve information asymmetry with outside parties (Watts and Zimmermann 1986).   
Since financial reporting requires a great deal of judgment, the financial expertise 
of the preparers (i.e. CFOs) potentially plays a significant role in shaping the attributes of 
accounting numbers, especially under more complex regulations post-SOX. Feng et al. 
(2008) document evidence that many CFOs are involved in earnings manipulation 
because they succumb to the pressure of the CEO. Financial expertise potentially plays a 
greater role when CFOs are under pressure from their supervisor (i.e. the CEO) to 
misreport results.13 Guan et al. (2005) find that CFO resignation is associated with 
income increasing accruals in the year of resignation. They suggest that it is very likely 
that when asked by top management to alter earnings reports, many CFOs choose to 
resign instead of complying with the request. The income increasing accruals in the year 
of resignation indicate that top management is successful in pressuring the new CFO to 
manage earnings.  
CFOs with a better understanding of accounting are more likely to refuse such 
requests since they have stronger arguments for doing so. For instance, CFOs with 
financial expertise potentially have a greater appreciation for the economic and legal 
consequences of errors in reporting. The demand hypothesis suggests that firms hire 
CFOs with financial expertise and accounting qualifications to improve earnings quality. 
                                                 
13
 According to a survey by CFO Magazine reported in 1998, 45 percent of CFOs in the sample have been 
asked by business executives to misrepresent results; 38 percent of that group did so. Another survey by 
Business Week Magazine found that about two-thirds of CFOs have been asked by their colleagues to 
misrepresent results; 55 percent fought it off, while 12 percent complied with the request (Barr 1998, Fink 
1998). This fact is also recognized by regulators. Lynn E. Turner, then the SEC Chief Accountant, in his 
speech on September 29, 2000 pointed out that many CFOs are under significant pressure to misrepresent 
financial results (SEC 2000).  
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This is consistent with the findings in Aier et al. (2005) that CFO financial expertise 
lowers the probability of financial restatement. In another study, Li et al. (2008) find that 
for companies receiving an adverse SOX 404 opinion on internal control quality, hiring a 
CFO with accounting qualification (i.e. CPA) increases the probability of receiving a 
clean opinion in the following year. Thus, financial expertise provides firms with 
economic benefits as it reduces the probability of having to pay the costs of misreporting 
(e.g. investor litigations, stock price decreases due to restatements or SEC investigations). 
Logically, financial expertise should be valued by the labor market. Consistent with this 
argument, Hoitash et al. (2007) find that CFOs are paid a higher salary if they are a 
former audit partner. 
 
2.2.2 Financial expertise and the opportunistic behavior hypothesis. 
Agency theory suggests that both managers and shareholders are economically 
rational and are utility maximizers (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Since managers’ 
interests are not necessarily aligned with those of the shareholders, opportunistic 
managers are likely to maximize their own welfare instead of firm value. Empirical 
evidence of self-serving behavior in financial reporting practice is presented by Lewellen 
et al. (1996), who find that the industry and peer-company stock return benchmarks 
selected by management are downward biased, overstating the relative performance of 
the firms. In another study, Barton and Mercer (2005) find that managers often blame a 
firm’s poor performance on external factors to manipulate market perceptions of 
management’s credibility and the firm’s outlook.  
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Moe (2005) argues that agents’ expertise is one of the sources of information 
asymmetry. In an agency setting, managers’ financial expertise potentially increases the 
magnitude of an existing information asymmetry between managers and owners, and 
widens moral hazard problems. With expertise, managers are able to generate more 
information and more accurately assess the value of the firm, so they are better informed 
compared to shareholders. However, managers with financial expertise have a greater 
opportunity, not only to improve the quality of financial reporting but also to engineer 
more sophisticated earnings manipulations in order to outsmart internal control systems 
and board of director monitoring and reap personal economic gains. Under SOX, CFOs 
are currently dealing with boards of directors with increased financial expertise, tougher 
legal consequences for accounting fraud, increased market awareness of financial 
reporting, and higher shareholder expectation of earnings quality. As a consequence, 
managing earnings may require rational managers to possess a higher degree of 
sophistication. Given a certain level of monitoring by owners, improved financial 
expertise provides apparatus for self-serving managers to conduct earnings management 
and thus reduce earnings quality.  
 
2.3. Measures of earnings quality 
 Earnings quality is contextual; that is, different interest groups define it differently 
(Dechow and Schrand 2004). In a broad sense, earnings quality is commonly defined as 
the extent to which reported earnings reflect the true or unbiased earnings, where greater 
alignment suggests higher-quality earnings (e.g. Pratt 2000). As true or unbiased earnings 
are not observable, various proxies have been employed by accounting researchers to 
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infer earnings quality. The literature suggests that higher quality earnings possess high 
accruals quality (Francis et al. 2004, Francis et al. 2005, Aboody et al. 2005, Jenkins et 
al. 2006, Ball and Shivakumar 2006a, Chan et al. 2006, Wang 2006), are more persistent 
(Penman and Zhang 2002, Schipper and Vincent 2003, Francis et al. 2004, Skinner 2004, 
Richardson et al. 2005), are more predictable (Lipe 1990, Francis et al. 2004, Graham et 
al. 2005), are smoother (Francis et al. 2004, Tucker and Zarowin 2006), show a greater 
return-earnings relationship (Vafeas 2000, Wang 2006, Jenkins et al. 2006), are more 
conservative (Watts 2003, Wang 2006) and are more timely (Bushman et al. 2004, 
Francis et al. 2004). Some studies (e.g. Dechow et al. 1995, Caskey and Hanlon 2005) 
use SEC enforcement actions as an indication of a lack of earnings quality.  
Predictions of the effect of CFO financial expertise on earnings quality are 
developed under the demand hypothesis and the opportunistic behavior hypothesis. On 
one hand, the demand hypothesis argues that firms need to hire CFOs with financial 
expertise to improve financial reporting, suggesting a positive association between 
expertise and earnings quality. On the other hand, agency theory assumes that managers 
behave opportunistically (see Jensen and Meckling 1976) and thus will use their expertise 
to maximize their economic utility through earnings management, suggesting a negative 
association between expertise and earnings quality. The use of an agency framework 
implies that earnings quality measures should capture managerial opportunism generated 
by asymmetric information between managers and owners.  
Earnings quality measures in this study are based on Francis et al. (2004). They 
present a comprehensive set of earnings attributes and their effects on the cost of equity. 
The attributes include accruals quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value 
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relevance, timeliness, and conservatism; the first four are characterized as accounting-
based, while the last three are market-based attributes. The attributes have been widely 
used in earnings quality studies. In this study, three of Francis et al.’s (2004) earnings 
attributes are used to measure earnings quality: accruals quality, persistence, and 
conservatism. The other four attributes (i.e. predictability, smoothness, value relevance, 
and timeliness) are not included because of data limitations. The computation of the other 
four attributes requires time-series data which cannot be applied in this study since this 
study uses cross-sectional data. For example, the computation of Lipe’s (1990) measure 
of earnings predictability requires ten years of observations, which means that only firms 
whose CFO already had ten years of CFO experience are included in the sample. Since 
the average length of CFO experience is less than five years, the use of time series data to 
compute the other four attributes will reduce the number of unique firms significantly. 
Thus, the inability to use earnings quality measures which require longer time-series data 
is one of the limitations of this study. Another earnings quality measure used in Fan and 
Wong (2002) and Wang (2006), earnings informativeness, is included to capture 
earnings-return relationships in cross sectional studies. Discussions of each of these 
measures are the following.  
 
2.3.1. Accruals quality and financial expertise 
SOX section 404 suggests that firms’ internal control is one of the determinants of 
financial reporting quality. Consistent with the requirement to disclose internal control 
problems, Doyle et al. (2007) find that internal control weaknesses increase errors in 
accrual estimation, reducing the quality of accruals. In another study, Li et al. (2008) also 
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find that CFOs with financial expertise (i.e. CPA) are more effective in fixing internal 
control problems. The findings of the two studies combined suggest that empirically, 
CFOs with financial expertise and a better understanding of accounting procedures are 
more capable of putting controls over financial reporting in place, which will potentially 
improve accruals quality.  
Another determinant of accruals quality is firm characteristics (Dechow and 
Dichev 2002).14 Firm characteristics (e.g. sales volatility, transaction complexity) may 
introduce uncertainty and add error into managers’ accounting estimates, reducing the 
accruals-cash flow relationship. The findings by Dechow and Dichev (2002) open the 
door for an alternative explanation, such that high accruals quality does not necessarily 
mean low earnings management; it could be the result of better judgments and more 
precise accounting estimates by the CFO. CFOs with financial expertise have the ability 
to produce more accurate accounting estimates given the complexity of the transactions 
and the nature of the business, and thus are capable of reducing estimation errors in 
accruals.  
In contrast, under the framework developed by Jones (1991) and its modified 
versions (Dechow et al. 1995, Kothari et al. 2005), the majority of studies on accruals 
assume that a departure from the normal accruals level is mainly due to opportunistic 
earnings management. Such an assumption is consistent with the self-serving view of 
managerial behavior. In an agency relationship, financial expertise potentially causes 
greater information asymmetry between managers and owners and increases moral 
hazard problems. Expertise in the hands of self-serving managers may be used to help 
                                                 
14
 Dechow and Dichev (2002) define accruals quality as the extent to which working capital accruals map 
into cash flows realizations. 
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them manipulate earnings, which reduces accruals quality (i.e. introduces greater 
estimation errors in accruals) and at the same time conceals the reduction from investors 
and regulators. Therefore, a non-directional hypothesis on the effect of financial expertise 
on accruals quality is stated as follows: 
H1: There is an association between accruals quality and the financial expertise of 
CFOs.  
   
2.3.2. Persistence and financial expertise 
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) find that earnings innovations with higher persistence 
are assigned a greater value by investors. Determinants of earnings persistence include 
firm characteristics such as size, barriers to entry, product type, and capital intensity (see 
e.g. Lev 1983, Baginski et al. 1999). Another determinant of persistence is managers’ use 
of discretionary accruals. Firms may want to communicate their assessment of future 
performance by using accruals as a signaling device (see e.g. Tucker and Zarowin 2006), 
which will increase earnings persistence. The demand hypothesis suggests that since 
CFOs with expertise make better assessments of firms’ future performance, expertise 
potentially increases the smoothness of the earnings stream and as a consequence, 
earnings persistence is improved. Alternatively, since compensation committees consider 
earnings persistence in rewarding executives (Baber et al. 1998), CFOs may face pressure 
from their supervisor to manage earnings to boost persistence. CFOs also may have their 
own economic incentive to manage earnings (e.g. Geiger and North 2006). In this case, 
financial expertise will potentially be used to manage earnings opportunistically to arrive 
at higher earnings persistence.  
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Using cross-sectional data, this study is not able to measure firms’ “true 
persistence” of earnings. Instead, this study can only test whether CFO financial expertise 
variables tend to lead reported earnings to increase or decrease in the following period. 
Some studies (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, DeGeorge et al. 1999) argue that firms 
manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases. Therefore, earnings management could also 
be accomplished through earnings decreases (i.e. taking a bath) to increase the probability 
of achieving an earnings target in the following period. However, the incentives to have 
an increase in earnings in the next period should be more prevalent and outweigh any big 
bath effects under both the demand and the opportunistic behavior hypothesis. Consistent 
with this argument, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and DeGeorge et al. (1999) find that 
the number of firms reporting a small increase in earnings is abnormally high while the 
number of firms reporting a small decrease in earnings is abnormally low. The hypothesis 
is stated as follows: 
H2: There is a positive association between earnings persistence and financial 
expertise of CFOs. 
 
2.3.3. Conservatism and financial expertise 
Lobo and Zhou (2006) report that firms are more conservative in their financial 
reports following the requirement for CEO/CFO certification. Post-SOX, reports suggest 
that more firms hire CFOs with financial expertise. Financial expertise potentially 
improves a CFO’s ability to appreciate the economic and legal consequences of errors 
created by aggressive accounting. Therefore, CFOs with financial expertise are likely to 
be more conservative in financial reporting. The demand hypothesis suggests that as the 
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demand for conservatism increases, CFOs with financial expertise are more likely to 
deliver more conservative accounting numbers. In the hands of self-serving managers, 
however, financial expertise may have a negative effect on conservatism. For instance, 
opportunistic managers may be tempted to recognize revenues too early to achieve a 
bonus target. Therefore, a non-directional hypothesis on the effect of financial expertise 
on conservatism is stated as follows:  
H3: There is an association between conservatism and financial expertise of 
CFOs.  
 
2.3.4. Earnings informativeness and financial expertise
 
 The strength of market reactions to unexpected returns increases with the 
perceived credibility of earnings information (Fan and Wong 2002). If earnings 
information is noisy (i.e. possesses high information risks), investors demand a higher 
rate of return, which will lead to weaker earnings-returns relations (Easton and 
Zmijewski 1989). Francis et al. (2005) provide evidence that investors incorporate 
information risk, proxied by accruals quality, along with other types of risk in valuation 
processes. This evidence suggests that proper accounting method choices combined with 
more precise accounting estimates potentially improve accruals quality and thus reduce 
information risk and consequently strengthen market reactions to earnings information. 
As CFOs with financial expertise are potentially more capable of reducing noise in 
earnings, financial expertise is expected to improve the credibility of earnings and 
increase earnings informativeness.  
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  However, if the market believes that CFOs with financial expertise are self-
serving, the presence of a CFO with financial expertise may have a negative effect on 
earnings informativeness because the users of financial reports will be more cautious in 
digesting accounting numbers. If investors perceive that financial executives with 
expertise have stronger incentives and the skills to manage earnings, the effects of 
expertise on earnings informativeness may be reversed or at least have a mixed direction. 
Therefore, the prediction of the association between earnings informativeness and 
financial expertise is the following: 
H4: There is an association between earnings informativeness and financial 
expertise of CFOs.  
 
In summary, the expected relationships between CFO financial expertise and the 
four earnings quality measures under both the demand hypothesis and the opportunistic 
behavior hypothesis are presented in Table 1.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1. Explanatory Variables for Financial Expertise 
 The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC 1999) suggests that financial expertise may 
come from past employment experience in accounting or finance, having a professional 
certification in accounting, or any other experience or background (e.g. education) which 
results in individuals’ financial sophistication. Following this definition, this study 
employs three variables to capture CFO financial expertise: i) whether the CFO is a CPA, 
ii) whether the CFO has an advanced degree in business (e.g. MBA, MS in Accounting, 
or other equivalent degrees), iii) the number of years the officer has been the CFO of the 
firm. In addition to these variables, I include the age of the CFO as CFO age could proxy 
for the CFO’s past working experience and older CFOs could behave differently from 
younger ones. Another financial expertise variable in this study is EXPERT, which is 
defined as a CFO with a CPA license, an MBA degree, and more years of CFO 
experience than the sample median. CFO age is excluded from this definition and will be 
treated as one of the control variables. A Pearson’s correlation analysis will be employed 
to test the possibility of multicollinearity problems among the financial expertise 
variables.
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These variables have been used in previous studies. For example, Aier et al. 
(2005) and Li et al. (2008) used the CPA designation as a proxy for CFO financial 
expertise. As the certification entails a deep understanding of accounting, auditing, and 
financial reporting, an executive holding a CPA should possess a certain level of financial 
reporting expertise. The use of MBA as another measure of financial expertise is based 
on the premise that such graduate business education provides not only a set of 
knowledge about general business but also a better understanding of accounting and a 
degree of financial reporting expertise. This view is supported by Wier et al. (2005), who 
document that advanced degrees in business contribute to the future success of 
accounting professionals through better job performance evaluations. With respect to 
CFO age, some other studies (e.g. by Ge et al. 2008) found that older CFOs tend to be 
more conservative in selecting financial reporting strategies. 
 The financial expertise data are gathered from several sources. The starting point 
of the data collection is the firms’ 10-Ks (annual reports submitted to the SEC) to 
document the name of the principal financial officer who certified the financial report of 
each firm in the sample, and the number of years the officer had been the CFO of the 
company.15 Only a small number of firms in the sample disclose the educational 
background and professional certification of the officers in their 10-Ks or proxy 
statements. For most firms in the sample, the financial expertise data of the CFOs were 
collected from various sources other than 10-Ks or proxy statements. These sources 
include the Reference Book of Corporate Management released by Dun and Bradstreet, 
                                                 
15
 Some firms do not officially have a top executive position with the title “Chief Financial Officer.” In this 
case, an executive with an equivalent position (e.g. Treasurer or Vice President of Finance) acts as the 
principal financial officer and certifies the financial reports. Regardless of the title, the principal financial 
officer is the one about which the expertise data are collected.  
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Who’s Who in Finance and Business, executive profiles on the company’s website, press 
releases, and other sources on the internet such as Business Week online. Additional 
information such as previous working experience in public accounting, the undergraduate 
major, and the name of the educational institution from which the CFO acquired the 
advanced degree in business were also collected.  
 
3.2. Proxies for Earnings Quality 
 The discussions on the models used to compute the four earnings quality 
measures are the following.  
3.2.1. Accruals quality 
 The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) is used 
to compute accruals. The model is stated as follows: 
 
∆WCit = β0 + β1 CFi,t-1 +β2 CFt +β3 CFi,t+1 +β4  ∆Salesit +β5 PPEit + εit  [1] 
 
where for firm i, 
∆WCit = changes in working capital defined as changes in accounts receivable (item 302) 
+ changes in inventory (item 303) – changes in accounts payable (item 304) – 
changes in tax payable (item 305) + change in other assets (item 307), deflated 
by average total assets;16 
CFi,t-1  = cash flows from operation (item 308) at time t – 1, deflated by average total 
asset;  
CFi,t  = cash flows from operation (item 308) at time t, deflated by average total asset; 
                                                 
16
 These are the item numbers in the COMPUSTAT database of financial reporting information.  
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CFi,t+1  = cash flows from operation (item 308) at time t + 1, deflated by average total 
asset;  
∆Salesit  = changes in sales (item 12) at time t deflated by average total assets (item 6); 
PPEit = property, plant and equipment at time t deflated by average total assets (data 
item 6);  
εit = error term which measures the magnitude of abnormal accruals.  
 
The absolute value of the residuals from Equation [1] is the measure of accruals quality, 
with a larger value signifying lower accruals quality. 
 Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that their model is better specified when 
applied on a firm-level basis, as reflected by a higher explanatory power. Firm-level 
analysis requires time-series of observations for each firm. However, since this study uses 
cross-sectional observations for the independent variables, this study will use industry-
specific regressions to compute the accrual estimation error as has been used in Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006b), followed by Wang (2006). The procedure requires at least 30 
observations in each industry.  
 The absolute value of the residuals from Equation [1] is used as the dependent 
variable in Equation [2], as a proxy for accruals quality.  
 
AB_ACCRit = β0 + β1CPAit + β2MBAit + β3LENGTHit +β4CFOAGEit + β5SIZEit  
+ β6ROAit + β7 LEVit + β8LOSSit + β9GROWTHit + β10AUDit  
+ β11Fixed effects+ εit       [2]  
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where for firm i, 
AB_ACCRit  = absolute value of residuals obtained from Equation [1]; 
CPAit   = a dummy variable set to 1 if the CFO is a CPA, 0 otherwise; 
MBAit   = a dummy variable set to 1 if the CFO has an MBA degree, 0 otherwise; 
LENGTHit  = the number of years the officer has been the CFO of the firm; 
CFOAGE = the age of the CFO.  
SIZEit   = firm size, as measured by the natural log of total assets at year t; 
ROAit  = net income at year t divided by average total assets at year t;  
LEVit   = leverage at year t, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LOSSit   = a dummy variable set to 1 if net income < 0 at year t, and 0 otherwise; 
GROWTHit = growth rate as measured by changes in sales at year t.  
AUDit = a dummy variable set to 1 if the auditor is one of the Big-four firms, and 
0 otherwise.  
Fixed effects = industry dummies based on firms’ two-digit SIC codes and year dummies. 
 
Following Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Wang (2006), the control variables to 
test the association between CFO financial expertise and accruals quality include firm 
size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), leverage (LEV), risk for bankruptcy (LOSS), and sales 
growth (GROWTH). Firms usually reduce political costs (as proxied by firm size) and 
relax debt covenants (as proxied by leverage) through earnings management. Prior 
research (e.g. Warfield 1995) indicates that riskier and high-growth firms usually have 
larger abnormal accruals. The model also controls for audit quality (AUD). If the demand 
hypothesis holds, the regression coefficients β1, β2, and β3, are expected to be negative, 
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while if the opportunistic behavior hypothesis holds, the coefficients are expected to be 
positive. 
 
3.2.2. Persistence 
Following Ali and Zarowin (1992), Sloan (1996), and Francis et al. (2004), I 
measure earnings persistence as the slope coefficient of the regression of current earnings 
on lagged earnings. The relationship between current earnings and prior earnings can be 
expressed as: 
 
Xi,t  = β0 + β1 Xi,t-1 + εi,t           [3] 
 
where for firm i, 
Xi,t  = earnings per share before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets at 
year t,  
Xi, t -1  = one year lagged earnings per share scaled by average total assets.  
  
Earnings are more persistent the closer β1 in Equation [3] is to 1 and less persistent when 
it is closer to 0. Lev (1983) and Baginski et al. (1999) point out a set of variables that, 
according to economic theories, will determine firms’ earnings persistence. These 
variables are barriers-to-entry (BTE), capital intensity (CAP), and firm size (SIZE). I 
modified the persistence model in Equation [3] to incorporate these three variables. In the 
modified model, I also control for sales growth (GROWTH) and net loss (LOSS). Growth 
firms (usually relatively small firms) are more risky and are likely to have less persistent 
 30
earnings. Since earnings are mean reverting, earnings of firms incurring losses are 
expected to be less persistent. Controlling for these factors, I use the model as follows to 
test the association between earnings persistence and CFO financial expertise: 
 
Xi,t  = β0 + β1 Xi,t-1 + β2 Xi,t-1*CPAi,t + β3 Xi,t-1*MBAi,t + β4 Xi,t-1*LENGTHi,t  
+ β5 Xi,t-1*CFOAGEi,t + β6 Xi,t-1*BTEi,t + β7 Xi,t-1*CAPi,t + β8 Xi,t-1*SIZEi, t-1 
+ β9 Xi,t-1*GROWTHi,t + β10 Xi,t-1*LOSSi,t + β11Fixed Effects+ εi,t     [4] 
 
where for firm i, 
BTEi,t = research and development expenses and advertising expenses at year t, deflated 
by total sales.  
CAPi,t = depreciation, depletion, and amortization expense at year t, deflated by total 
sales.  
SIZEi,t = the natural log of the market value of equity at year t.  
 
All other variables have been previously defined. I expect that β2, β3, β4 in 
Equation [4] will be positive, indicating that CFO financial expertise improves earnings 
persistence.  
 
3.2.3 Conservatism  
Basu (1997) finds that earnings are more sensitive to negative returns than to 
positive returns, indicating the prevalence of conservatism in financial reporting among 
US firms. The model used in Basu (1997) is stated as follows:  
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Xit/Pi,t-1 = α0 + α1DRit + β0Rit + β1Rit*DRit.       [5] 
 
where, 
Xi = earnings per share for firm i in the fiscal year; 
Pi,t-1 = the price per share at the beginning of the year; 
DRi = a dummy variably set to 1 if Ri < 0, and 0 otherwise; 
Ri = the stock return for firm i from 9 months before fiscal year-end to three months 
after fiscal year-end.  
 
In Equation 5, Basu’s conservatism is technically defined as (β0 +β1)/β0 where a 
greater number represents a higher degree of conservatism. In this study, Basu’s measure 
of conservatism has been modified to test the association between conservatism and the 
financial expertise of CFOs by incorporating the financial expertise variables. The 
modified version of the regression equation is as follows:  
 
Xi/Pi,t-1 = α0 + α1DRi + β0Ri + β1Ri*DRi.  
+ γ0CPA + γ1CPA*DRi + γ2CPA* Ri + γ3CPA*Ri*DRi  
+ δ0MBA + δ1MBA*DRi + δ2MBA* Ri + δ3MBA*Ri*DRi  
+ φ0LENGTH + φ1LENGTH*DRi + φ2LENGTH* Ri + φ3LENGTH*Ri*DRi  
+ µ0CFOAGE + µ1CFOAGE*DRi + µ2CFOAGE*Ri + µ3CFOAGE*Ri*DRi + νi,t 
          [6] 
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In Equation [6], β0 measures how quickly good news is recognized by CFOs 
without financial expertise. The corresponding measure for CFOs with a CPA is β0 + γ2. 
If CFOs with a CPA tend to slow recognition of good news (are more conservative), γ2 is 
expected to be negative. Similarly, if CFOs with an MBA, those with more CFO 
experience, and older CFOs are more conservative, then δ2, φ2, and µ2 are expected to be 
negative. The speed of bad news recognition by CFOs without financial expertise is 
captured by β1. The incremental role of the financial expertise variables in bad news 
recognition is captured by γ3, δ3, φ3, and µ3. If the expertise variables accelerate the 
recognition of bad news, then γ3, δ3, φ3, and µ3 are expected to be positive.  
 
3.2.4. Earnings informativeness 
Earnings numbers are informative when there is a change in expectation upon the 
release of earnings information, as reflected in a change in stock price (see Kormendi and 
Lipe 1987). In capital market studies, the relation between earnings and returns can be 
expressed as: 
 
RETit = δ0 + δ1NIit + εit        [7] 
 
where for firm i: 
RETit  = holding period return for 12-months for year t, ending 3 months after the fiscal 
year end; 
NIit = net income before extraordinary items, scaled by the market value of equity at 
the beginning of the year; 
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Earnings are considered informative when δ1 in Equation [7] is statistically 
different from zero. The association between earnings informativeness and CFO financial 
expertise is tested by incorporating financial expertise variables into the model. 
Following Fan and Wong (2002) and Wang (2006), I control for firm size (SIZE), 
market-to-book value (MB), leverage (LEV) and loss firms (LOSS). I also control for 
audit quality (AUD) as the quality of the audit is likely to improve the credibility of 
accounting information and potentially strengthen market reactions to the information 
(e.g. Teoh and Wong 1993). The following equation is used to test the association 
between earnings informativeness and financial expertise: 
 
RETit = δ0 + δ1NIit + δ2NIit*CPAit + δ3NIit*MBAit + δ4NIit*LENGTHit  
+ δ5NIit*CFOAGEit + δ6NIit* SIZEit + δ7NIit*LEVit + δ8NIit*MBit + δ9NIit*AUDit 
+ δ10NIit*LOSSit + δ11Fixed effects + εit     [8] 
 
where for firm i, 
MBit = market-to-book ratio at time t; 
 
All other variables have been previously defined.  The coefficients of the 
interaction terms in Equation [8] between net income and CPA, net income and MBA, 
and net income and LENGTH will show whether there is an association between 
financial expertise and earnings informativeness. Significant positive (negative) 
regression coefficients indicate that CFO financial expertise increases (reduces) the 
informativeness of earnings.  
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3.2.5 Additional Tests 
For equations [2], [4], [6], and [8], additional tests will be conducted to examine 
the effect of individual expertise variables (CPA, MBA, LENGTH, CFOAGE, and 
EXPERT) on the measures of earnings quality where only one expertise variable is 
included in each regression model. These tests are performed because there is a 
possibility that some expertise variables are correlated to each other. The results of these 
tests are presented in the tables and are referred to as Model 2 through Model 6.  
 
3.3. Sample Description 
 This study uses the Standard and Poor’s 1500 (S&P1500) index as the sample 
firms. The index consists of three groups of firms: the S&P 500, the S&P 400 and the 
S&P 600, which represents the 500 largest firms, 400 midsize firms, and the 600 smallest 
firms in terms of market capitalizations. Eliminating financial and utility firms reduces 
the number of unique firms from 1,500 to 1,116 in the sample. A total of 35 firms with 
insufficient information about their CFO are excluded from the sample, reducing the 
number of unique firms to 1,081.17  
The use of the S&P 1500 firms allows this study to investigate whether the 
association between earnings quality and CFO financial expertise exists only, or is more 
prevalent, among firms of a certain size. For example, larger firms are known to be more 
complex (e.g. with more lines of business, geographic segments) and CFOs of such firms 
have to deal with more sophisticated reporting tasks and economic transactions. This 
could mean that to be a competent CFO of a large firm requires a higher degree of 
                                                 
17
 These eliminated firms include firms with more than one CFO at the time of financial report certification 
and firms who fail to provide information as to how long the CFOs have been holding the position. 
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financial expertise. However, CFOs of large firms are more likely to be supported by 
subordinates with financial reporting expertise (e.g. Chief Accounting Officer), 
weakening the association between CFO financial expertise and earnings quality.  
Among small firms, on the contrary, financial reporting is usually less complex 
and thus the reporting process may require less expertise compared to the process in large 
firms. A CFO of a smaller firm will have a relatively more direct role in the process of 
financial reporting, potentially leading to a stronger relationship between the level of 
CFO financial expertise and the quality of financial reporting. Thus, firm size creates a 
difference in the reporting environment especially in determining the need for a CFO 
with financial expertise and the level of the CFO’s direct involvement in the process of 
financial reporting. Examining the effects of CFO financial expertise on the quality of 
financial reporting under these different settings will cast light on whether the presence 
and the strength of such a relationship is related to firm size.  
Financial and utility firms are excluded from the sample. The year 2005 was 
selected to allow the inclusion of lead variables in computing some earnings quality 
measures such as accruals quality. The selection of the year 2005 implies that the CFOs 
of the S&P 1500 firms whose information was collected are the ones who, together with 
the CEOs, certified the financial reports of the fiscal year ending in 2005. Included in the 
analysis are only CFOs who had been with the firm for at least three years as its principal 
financial officer. This is to make sure that the CFO had been in the current position “long 
enough” to influence the attributes of financial reporting, thus reinforcing the relationship 
between earnings quality and CFO financial expertise. Moreover, such a procedure is 
necessary to eliminate the effect of CFO turnover (which was prevalent after SOX 
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became effective in 2002) and, if not accounted for, would weaken the relationship 
between the independent and the dependent variables in this study. Thus, interim CFOs 
and those who did not certify all of the firm’s financial reports for at least three years are 
excluded from the sample. Most CFOs are hired in the middle of a fiscal year, which 
implies that it is very likely that during the first year of the new CFO tenure, the financial 
reports are influenced by both the old and the new CFO, creating some noise in the 
model. Another argument is that the “big bath phenomenon” is not only associated with 
the appointment of new CEOs; the study by Geiger and North (2006) shows that 
companies that appoint a new CFO often reduce reported earnings by reducing 
discretionary accruals in their initial years to increase the probability of performance 
improvement in the subsequent years. Since most of the earnings quality measures in this 
study are accounting based, the reversals of accruals around the appointment of new 
CFOs will create noise that will reduce the reliability of the tests. Therefore, in an effort 
to minimize such noise, CFOs are included in the hypothesis tests only after they certified 
financial reports for at least the third time, at the cost of a reduction in the number of 
unique firms.  
To increase the number of observations, the year 2004 was also used on the 
condition that a CFO had at least three years of CFO experience in the firm in each of 
those years. For example, Roger Plank had been the CFO of Apache Corp. since 1997 
and so in 2004 he had been the CFO of the firm for seven years. Therefore he is included 
in the sample for the years 2004 and 2005. However, in the year 2005, Edmund P. 
Segner, III had been the CFO of EOG Resources, Inc. for only three years. He is only 
included in the sample for the year 2005, not for 2004, since in 2004 he had been the 
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CFO of the firm for only two years and therefore did not meet the minimum requirement 
of three years of CFO experience.  
The earnings quality measures and the control variables are computed using 
financial reporting data obtained from the COMPUSTAT database, and stock price 
information gathered from the CRSP database. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Initial Sample 
  Appendix A presents the list of the sample firms classified by the two-digit SIC 
code and by the S&P classification. As shown in Panel A of Appendix A, the industry 
with the largest number of observations is Business Services (135 firms), followed by 
Electronic & Other Electronic Equipment (120 firms), Chemical & Allied Products (96 
firms), Instruments & Related Products (83 firms), Industrial Machinery (77 firms), Oil 
and Gas Extraction (44 firms), Transportation Equipment (41 firms), and Wholesale 
Trade-Durable Goods (35 firms). Panel B of Appendix A describes the initial sample in 
this study, with the S&P 500 represented by 348 unique firms, while the S&P 400 and the 
S&P 600 have 282 and 451 unique firms in the sample, respectively. 
 
 4.1.1 CFO Financial Expertise and the S&P Classification 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the financial expertise background of 
CFOs of the S&P 1500 firms in the sample. The average CFO tenures among the S&P 
500, the S&P 400, and the S&P 600 firms are 4.14 years, 4.44 years, and 4.65 years, 
respectively. This is consistent with the result of a survey reported by Durfee (2005).18
                                                 
18
  A study by Spencer and Stuart suggests that the average CFO tenure for the Fortune 1000 companies is 
4.3 years (Durfee 2005). 
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The average age of CFOs overall firms is 50.04 years with those among the S&P 500, the 
S&P 400, and the S&P 600 firms 50.85, 49.53, and 49.68 years, respectively. Overall, 
453 or 41.90 percent of 1,081 CFOs in the sample hold a CPA while 464 or 42.92 percent 
of 1081 CFOs have an advanced degree in business.19 This is also roughly similar to the 
survey reported in Durfee (2005) who found that among the Fortune 1,000 companies, 45 
percent of the CFOs hold a CPA and 41 percent of them have an MBA. On average, 
CFOs of smaller firms have a slightly longer experience in the current position, which 
might indicate that CFO turnover is more prevalent among large firms. The data show 
that around 30% of the CFOs have had previous work experience in at least one of the 
Big-five accounting firms.20  
Among CFOs who hold an advanced degree in business in this study, the most 
likely alma maters are Harvard University and the University of Chicago (each with 34 
CFOs), the University of Pennsylvania (30 CFOs), and Northwestern University (24 
CFOs). The full list of the academic institutions where the CFOs attended and obtained 
their advanced degree in business is presented in Appendix B, which includes a total of 
138 academic institutions.21 The data failed to disclose the alma mater of six CFOs in the 
sample. 
                                                 
19
 The terms “advanced degree in business” and MBA are used interchangeably in this study. Among the 
types of advanced degrees in business obtained by CFOs in the sample, MBA is the most common, with 
more than 95%. The remaining 5% include MS in Accounting, MS in Finance, MS in Taxation, etc.  
20
 A Big-five work experience is defined as having previously served as an employee in one of the Big-five 
accounting firms (Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers) or their predecessors. In many occasions, the sources of the information fail to 
specify whether they served in the audit or in another department, what the most recent position was, and 
the length of the experience. Although appealing, the information is noisy. Therefore, such information is 
only presented in the descriptive statistics but is not used in testing the hypotheses.  
21
 Even though there is a good reason to believe that some MBA programs are better than others and 
earning an MBA from the better schools might provide a higher level of financial expertise, I assume that 
the weight of each MBA degree is the same across CFOs because there is no strong basis for classifying the 
MBA programs into different groups and weighting them differently.  
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The proportion of CFOs who hold a CPA and an advanced degree in business 
varies with the S&P classification. The descriptive statistics reveal an interesting pattern 
that smaller firms are relatively more likely to have a CFO with a CPA and larger firms 
are more likely to have a CFO with an advanced degree in business. Among the S&P 500 
firms, the S&P 400 firms, and the S&P 600 firms, the proportions of CFOs who hold a 
CPA license are 33.05 percent, 42.9 percent, and 48.35 percent, respectively.22 By 
contrast, larger firms are relatively more likely to hire a CFO with an advanced degree in 
business. The proportion of CFOs with an advanced degree in business is 53.44 percent, 
41.49 percent, and 34.73 percent among the S&P 500 firms, the S&P 400 firms, and the 
S&P 600 firms, respectively. This finding suggests that compared to large firms, smaller 
firms provide more emphasis on the importance of a CPA designation when hiring a 
CFO. Larger firms, on the contrary, emphasize general and strategic skills more, as 
reflected in the high proportion of CFOs with an advanced degree in business (53.44 
percent) among the S&P 500 firms. A likely explanation of this pattern is that the 
complex nature of large firms requires their CFO to acquire a broader expertise, which 
can be obtained through graduate education in business.  
A total of 153, or 14.15 percent, of 1081 CFOs are CPAs and have an advanced 
degree in business. A further examination reveals that the probability of a CFO’s holding 
both a CPA and an advanced degree in business decreases with firm size. Among the 
S&P 500 firms, the proportion of CFOs who hold both a CPA license and an advanced 
                                                 
22
 There are 23 CFOs with a Certified Management Accountant (CMA) license in the sample. However, 17 
of the CFOs with a CMA also hold a CPA, leaving only 6 observations of CFOs with only a CMA. I do not 
use CMA as part of CFO financial expertise variables in this study since there is not enough variability and 
thus including CMA is not expected to generate significantly different results.  
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degree in business is only 10.92 percent, while among the S&P 400 and the S&P 600 
firms the proportion increases to 14.89 percent and 16.19 percent, respectively.  
Besides a CPA designation and graduate education in business, another possible 
source of financial expertise is CFOs’ work experience in public accounting. The 
statistics suggest that the CFOs of small and midsize firms are more likely to have had 
Big-five work experience.  The proportion of CFOs who have previously served in one or 
more of the Big-five accounting firms (or their predecessors) among the S&P 500 firms is 
only 23.85 percent while among the S&P 400 and the S&P 600 firms, 33.69 percent and 
34.60 percent of CFOs have had such experiences. This could further mean that it is more 
prevalent among small firms to hire their financial executives from accounting firms. 
Consistent with this result is a study by Dowdell and Krishnan (2003) which finds that 
firms employing their former external audit personnel in financial executive positions are 
usually smaller than the firms in the control sample. 
 It is expected that individuals who choose a career in public accounting are more 
likely and more motivated to acquire a CPA license to support their career. The 
descriptive statistics support this view. The majority (78.48 percent) of CFOs with Big-
five work experience hold a CPA, indicating a high correlation between having such 
experience and holding professional accounting certification.  
 
4.1.2 CFO Financial Expertise and Industry Classification 
 Among 1,081 unique firms in the initial sample, ten industries (based on two-digit 
SIC codes) have more than 30 observations.23 Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of 
                                                 
23
 The accruals quality test is conducted at the industry-level, which includes only firms in the industry with 
at least 30 observations.  
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CFO financial expertise data by industry classifications. The statistics show that 
Transportation Equipment is the industry with, on average, the oldest CFOs (52.20 years) 
while Business Services has the youngest CFOs (47.92 years). The industry with the 
highest proportion of CFOs holding a CPA is Instruments & Related Products (50.60 
percent) while the one with the lowest proportion is Food and Kindred Products (30.56 
percent). The Transportation Equipment industry has the highest proportion of CFOs with 
an MBA (56.10 percent) while Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods has the lowest one 
(31.42 percent). Further, Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods also has CFOs with the longest 
experience (5.34 years) while Industry Machinery & Equipment has the shortest (3.48 
years). Lastly, similar to CPA, the industry having the CFOs with the highest proportion 
of Big-five work experience is Instruments & Related Products while the one with the 
lowest proportion is Food and Kindred Products. This finding further strengthens the 
previous result that there is a high correlation between CPA certification and working 
experience with Big-five accounting firms.  
 
4.1.3 Characteristics of the Sample 
 The descriptive statistics for the sample to test H1 are presented in Table 4. The 
average value of absolute accruals (ABSACC) is 0.0240 for the overall sample (N=1251) 
with the S&P 500 firms (N=373) having the smallest ABSACC and the S&P 600 firms 
(N=556) having the largest average ABSACC. This suggests that the quality of accruals is 
higher among larger firms. The average annual sales growth (GROWTH) is 16.38 percent 
of the overall sample and decreases with firm size (SIZE), suggesting that small firms are 
more likely to exhibit growth. The table shows that larger firms tend to have higher 
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leverage (LEV) characteristics and have better earnings performance (ROA). Roughly 96 
percent of the firms in the sample are audited by one of the Big-five accounting firms 
(AUD), and larger firms are more likely to be audited by a Big-five accounting firm. 
Lastly, larger firms are less likely to report losses (LOSS).  
The descriptive statistics for the sample in the analysis of earnings persistence 
(H2) are presented in Table 5. Firms (N=1297) have an average net income (X) of 0.0716 
and larger firms tend to have higher net income (NI). The average capital expenditure 
(CAP) and the average barrier to entry (BTE) are 0.051 and 0.067, respectively. There is 
no clear pattern on the relationship between these two variables and firm size (SIZE).  
The descriptive statistics for the sample to test H3 are presented in Table 6. The 
average earnings per share (NI) for the whole sample (N=1137) is 0.047 and, similar to 
the data in Table 5, larger firms tend to have a higher earnings per share. The average 
return (RET) of the overall sample is16.94 percent and is negatively correlated with firm 
size (SIZE). The S&P 500, the S&P 400 and the S&P 600 have average returns of 13.95 
percent, 15.60 percent, and 19.95 percent, respectively. This is expected and is consistent 
with Fama and French (1995) who find that small firms tend to outperform larger firms. 
The proportion of firms with a negative return (DR) is 32.98 percent and these firms are 
distributed somewhat evenly among the three groups of the S&P classification.  
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample for the analysis of 
earnings informativeness (H4). The mean return (RET) of the overall sample (N=1312) is 
16.5 percent while the average net income (NI) is 0.050. Consistent with the data in Table 
4, the statistics suggest that the S&P 500 firms have the lowest returns (RET) at 14.64 
percent, while the S&P 400 and the S&P 600 firms earn 15.31 percent and 18.66 percent, 
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respectively. Further, Table 7 shows that larger firms tend to have a higher leverage 
(LEV), a lower book-to-market (BM) ratio, a higher probability of being audited by a Big-
five firm (AUD), and a lower probability of incurring a loss (LOSS).  
 
4.2. Correlation Analysis 
Tables 8 through 11 present the correlations among the CFO financial expertise 
variables and other variables used in the study for each individual hypothesis. For each 
table, Pearson correlations are presented above the diagonal while Spearman correlations 
are presented below the diagonal. The correlation tables indicate no multicorrelation 
problems among the financial expertise variables. Consistent with the descriptive 
statistics discussed earlier, the financial expertise variable CPA is negatively correlated 
with MBA. The negative correlation between CPA and MBA implies that in general 
CFOs with a CPA are less likely to have an advanced degree in business, and vice versa. 
A possible explanation for this pattern is that there are two (or more) different 
populations of CFOs. In the first population are CFOs who started their career in public 
accounting and are more likely to have acquired a CPA, and saw little necessity to obtain 
advanced education and training in business to support their career. Such CFOs are more 
likely to be hired by smaller, less complex firms. CFOs in the second population are the 
ones that have received an advanced degree in business administration and did not start 
their career in public accounting, and thus are relatively less motivated to acquire a CPA 
license. Large firms are more likely to hire these CFOs, who supposedly have a broader 
set of business knowledge and skills.  
 45
Interestingly, a CPA license is negatively correlated with the length of CFO 
experience (LENGTH). The negative correlation indicates that recently appointed CFOs 
are more likely to hold a CPA license than those who have been in the position relatively 
longer. Recently appointed CFOs are also more likely to have an advanced degree in 
business, as indicated by the negative correlation between MBA and LENGTH. These 
findings are consistent with claims that the recent trend is for more firms to hire CFOs 
with a better understanding of accounting (e.g. O’Sullivan 2004, Durfee 2005). Firm size 
(SIZE) is positively correlated with MBA and is negatively correlated with CPA, 
confirming earlier findings that small firms place more emphasis on a CPA designation 
while large firms emphasize a graduate education in business when hiring a CFO.  
CFOs with an advanced degree in business and those with more CFO experience 
tend to be older as reflected by the positive correlation between the variable CFOAGE 
and the variables MBA and LENGTH. By contrast, CFO’s age is negatively correlated 
with CPA, indicating that CFOs with a CPA are usually younger than those without the 
certification.  
 
4.3. Accruals Quality 
Table 12 presents the results on the association between accruals quality and CFO 
financial expertise (H1) under Model 1, which assumes no interactions among the 
financial expertise variables. The model (N=1251) is significant at a p-value of < 0.0001 
with an R-square of 7.08 percent. After controlling for fixed effects (i.e. industry and 
year), all regression coefficients on the financial expertise variables for the pooled sample 
appear to be insignificant, suggesting that CFO financial expertise is not associated with 
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the extent to which working capital accruals map into cash flow realizations. The 
coefficients of all control variables turn out to be as expected and most are significant. 
Firms of larger size (SIZE) are associated with higher accruals quality at a p-value of < 
0.0001 because large firms are operationally more predictable and more stable, results 
which leads to lower estimation errors in accruals (Dechow and Dichev 2002). Firms 
with a positive sales growth (GROWTH) have lower accruals quality (at a p-value of 
0.0046), which are also consistent with Dechow and Dichev (2002). As expected, firms’ 
leverage (LEV) is negatively associated with accruals quality (at a p-value of 0.0174), 
while firms’ audit quality (AUD) improves accruals quality (at a p-value of 0.0340). 
 Further examination of the association between financial expertise and accruals 
quality by the S&P classification generates partially significant results. The data show 
that only CFO age (CFOAGE) increases the quality of accruals among the S&P 500 firms 
(p-value = 0.0744), while the length of CFO experience (LENGTH) improves accruals 
quality among the S&P 400 firms (p-value = 0.070). The variables CPA and MBA do not 
show any significant effects on accruals quality among the S&P 500, the S&P 400, or the 
S&P 600 firms.  
 Regression Model 2 was developed to further examine the association between 
financial expertise variables and accruals quality by investigating possible interaction 
effects between the length of CFO experience and the variables CPA and MBA. Table 13 
presents the results of the regression analysis under this model. The results reveal a 
significant interaction effect between the variable CPA and the length of CFO experience 
on the quality of accruals (at a p-value of 0.0056) among the pooled sample firms. This 
suggests that the longer an officer with a CPA serves as a firm’s CFO, the better his/her 
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ability to reduce errors in estimating accruals. While CFOs with a CPA seem to gain 
knowledge from experience that helps them improve the quality of accruals over time, a 
similar result is not observed for CFOs with an advanced degree in business. The analysis 
shows no significant interaction effect between MBA and length of experience under the 
model.  
 Regression results by the S&P classification show no interaction effect between 
LENGTH and the variables CPA and MBA among the S&P 500 firms. A significant 
interaction effect between CPA and LENGTH on accruals quality exists only among 
small firms or the S&P 600 firms (p-value = 0.0012). Interestingly, a negative and 
significant interaction effect on accruals quality between MBA and LENGTH is observed 
among the S&P 400 firms (p-value = 0.0276). This may suggest that CFOs of midsize 
firms with an advance degree in business are more likely to manage earnings as they gain 
more experience as the firm’s CFO.  
 Table 14 presents the regression analysis (Model 3-7) using individual financial 
expertise variables. However, none of the variables turn out to significantly affect the 
quality of accruals.  
 
4.4. Earnings Persistence 
Table 15 reports the effect of CFO financial expertise on earnings persistence 
from regressions of current earnings on past earnings. In the pooled regression (N=1297), 
the model yields an F-value of 79.37 with an R-square of 49.80 percent. The coefficient 
on net income (X) is significant (p-value < 0.0001). As expected, sales growth 
(GROWTH) and firms’ capital expenditures positively affect earnings persistence (both at 
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a p-value < 0.0001). A net loss (LOSS) strongly reduces a firm’s earnings persistence (at 
p < 0.0001), indicating that in general firms experiencing losses will generate positive 
income in the following period. After controlling for fixed effects, among the CFO 
expertise variables, only CPA significantly improves the persistence of earnings at p-
values of 0.0439, while MBA, CFO experience, and CFO age do not have a significant 
incremental effect on earnings persistence. This could be interpreted as that firms whose 
CFO is a CPA tend to have an increase in net income the following period. 
Unfortunately, the test in this study is unable to further examine whether the increase in 
persistence comes from the CFOs’ ability to improve firms’ economic performance with 
the help of their professional certification or whether it is merely a reporting strategy 
through the use of discretionary accruals either to inform investors about future 
performance or to maximize their own personal benefits (see e.g. Baber et al. 1998).   
 A further examination reveals that most CFO expertise variables are not 
associated with earnings persistence in the regressions by the S&P classification. Only 
MBA affects earnings persistence among the S&P 600 firms and the effect is negative (p-
value = 0.0166). Among the S&P 500 firms (N=420), no expertise variable is observed to 
have a significant influence on persistence.  
 Table 16 presents the effects of individual expertise variables on earnings 
persistence (Model 2-6). The result is similar to the previous pooled regression where 
only CFOs with a CPA significantly improve the persistence of earnings (p-value of 
0.0283). Additionally, firms with expert CFOs tend to have higher earnings persistence 
(p-value of 0.0053).  
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4.5. Earnings Conservatism 
The regression results on the association between CFO expertise and earnings 
conservatism are summarized in Table 17. The pooled regression (N=1137) is significant 
at p-value < 0.0001 with an R-square of 11.59 percent. The results show that CFOs with 
an advanced degree in business are generally more conservative than their counterparts. 
The variable MBA significantly improves conservatism through both slowing down the 
recognition of good news (p-value = 0.00011) and accelerating the recognition of bad 
news (p-value < 0.0001). The results also indicate that, surprisingly, the variable CPA 
reduces earnings conservatism, as CFOs with a CPA tend to delay the recognition of bad 
news (p-value = 0.0434). The length of CFO experience and CFO age do no significantly 
affect earnings conservatism.  
 Regressions by the S&P classification further reveal that among large firms (the 
S&P 500 firms), only the variable MBA affects conservatism: CFOs with an advanced 
degree in business are more conservative in reporting earnings. The evidence shows that 
MBA postpones the recognition of good news (p-value = 0.0347) and accelerates the 
recognition of bad news (p-value of 0.003). Among the S&P 400, CFOs with longer CFO 
experience tend to be less conservative, as they accelerate the recognition of good news 
(p-value = 0.0082). The variable MBA also improves earnings conservatism among the 
S&P 600 firms through slow recognition of good news (p-value = 0.0089) and 
accelerated recognition of bad news (p-value = 0.0026). Further, CFOs with more CFO 
experience and older CFOs tend to delay the recognition of good news (p-values = 
0.0106 and 0.0811, respectively) and thus improve earnings conservatism.  
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 Table 18 presents the results of the regression analysis for each individual 
expertise variable. The results are relatively similar to the findings in Table 17. The 
variables MBA, LENGTH, and CFOAGE significantly improve earnings conservatism 
while CPA is the only variable that reduces conservatism. Further, the variable EXPERT 
does not seem to affect the conservatism of earnings.  
 
4.6. Earnings Informativeness 
Table 19 presents the results associated with H4. I exclude the one percent of 
extreme observations in each tail of the variables returns (RET) and net income (NI). 
After controlling for industry and year fixed effects (not shown in the table), the pooled 
regression analysis (N=1312) indicates that investors react more strongly to earnings 
information when the firm’s CFO holds a CPA license (p-value = 0.0522). On the other 
hand, firms whose CFO has an advanced degree in business have relatively less 
informative earnings (p-value = 0.0501). Neither CFO age nor the length of CFO 
experience significantly affect the informativeness of earnings. As expected, earnings 
informativeness decreases with firm size, book-to-market ratio, leverage, and negative 
earnings.  
Among the S&P 500 firms, earnings informativeness is improved when the firm’s 
CFO has a CPA license (p-value = 0.0479) and is reduced the longer the officer has been 
the firm’s CFO (p-value = 0.0697). The other two expertise variables, CFO age and 
MBA, do not significantly affect earnings informativeness. A possible explanation of this 
result is that among large firms, investors react relatively more strongly to earnings 
announcements when the financial reports are certified by CFOs with a CPA or by more-
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recently-appointed CFOs.  Among the S&P 400 firms, no expertise variable significantly 
affects the informativeness of earnings. Lastly, among the S&P 600 firms, CPA improves 
the informativeness of earnings and the coefficient is significant at a p-value of 0.0809. 
The coefficient on MBA is negative and significant among the S&P 600 firms at a p-
value 0.0218. This suggests that among the S&P 600 firms, investors’ reactions to 
earnings information are strengthened when a firm’s CFO holds a CPA while reactions 
are weakened when the CFO has an advanced degree in business. In other words, 
investors perceive that earnings information is more (less) reliable when the CFO of the 
reporting firm is a CPA (holds an advanced degree in business).  
The effects of individual expertise variables are presented in Table 20. The results 
show that CPA improves earnings informativeness (p-value = 0.0483) while MBA and 
EXPERT reduce the informativeness of earnings (p-value = 0.0507 and 0.0731, 
respectively).  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Reports suggest that public firms are hiring CFOs with more financial expertise. 
Through their knowledge of accounting and internal control over financial reporting, 
CFOs with financial expertise potentially have a significant influence over the quality of 
financial reporting. Because the demand for financial reporting quality has increased, this 
study investigates whether CFO financial expertise strengthens firms’ financial reporting 
practices and improves earnings quality. The increase in the responsibilities of CFOs in 
financial reporting oversight, as implied in the CFO certification requirement, suggests 
that financial expertise is essential for competent CFOs. The demand hypothesis predicts 
that CFOs with financial expertise will increase the quality earnings. Alternatively, the 
opportunistic behavior hypothesis suggests that CFO financial expertise could increase 
the probability of misreporting for the CFOs’ personal gain. With investors, boards of 
directors, and regulators becoming more vigilant and with financial reporting under the 
microscope, rational managers will only manage earnings opportunistically when they 
have the expertise to do so. 
This study finds that larger firms are relatively more likely to hire a CFO with an 
advanced degree in business while smaller firms are more likely to have a CFO with a
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CPA license. The data also show that recently appointed CFOs are more likely to be a 
CPA and/or have an advanced degree in business, suggesting an increasing demand for 
CFOs with financial expertise. CFOs of small firms (S&P 600 firms) are the most likely 
to have served in one of the Big-five accounting firms. This finding provides insight as to 
how public companies develop criteria in choosing their CFO under the current 
environment characterized by stronger regulations and oversight.  
This study finds that larger firms are relatively more likely to hire a CFO with an 
advanced degree in business while smaller firms are more likely to have a CFO with a 
CPA license. The data also show that recently appointed CFOs are more likely to be a 
CPA and/or have an advanced degree in business, suggesting an increasing demand for 
CFOs with financial expertise. CFOs of small firms (S&P 600 firms) are the most likely 
to have served in one of the Big-five accounting firms. This finding provides insight as to 
how public companies develop criteria in choosing their CFO under the current 
environment characterized by stronger regulations and oversight.  
This study provides mild results about the association between CFO financial 
expertise and the quality of earnings. Using industry-specific regressions to compute the 
measure of accruals quality, this study finds that CFO financial expertise is not associated 
with the quality of accruals for the pooled sample and for each of the S&P classifications. 
Further investigation finds that when combined with the length of CFO experience, CFOs 
with a CPA have a greater ability to minimize errors in accrual estimation, and thus 
improve the quality of accruals. As far as earnings persistence, the pooled regression 
shows that the variables CPA and EXPERT are associated with increased earnings 
persistence, while other variables are not. Using pooled regression, the variable MBA 
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improves conservatism by accelerating the recognition of bad news and/or delaying the 
recognition of good news. The presence of CFOs with a CPA surprisingly reduces 
earnings conservatism. Finally, this study finds that for the overall sample, earnings 
informativeness increases when the CFO is a CPA while it decreases when the CFO has 
an advanced degree in business or when the CFO is an “expert.” CPA improves 
informativeness among the S&P 500 and the S&P 600 firms. Table 21 summarizes the 
results of the multivariate regression analyses.   
This study improves our understanding of the effects of the presence of CFOs 
with financial expertise on earnings quality. Researchers have put great effort into 
discovering the determinants of financial reporting quality to strengthen investor 
protection. This study contributes to the accounting literature by showing that the 
appointment of CFOs with financial expertise and certain characteristics affects the 
attributes of earnings.  
Since the study use two years of data (2004 and 2005), there is an issue of firm 
and CFO fixed effects where one firm, with the same CFO, could be counted as two 
different observations. This issue is not addressed in the study and is considered one of 
the limitations of the study. Another limitation of the study is the inability to use longer 
time-series observations, which are necessary to compute some other earnings quality 
measures.
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Table 1 
The Expected Relationship between CFO Financial Expertise and Earnings Quality 
          
Earnings Quality 
Measures 
 
 Expected Signs 
 
Demand Hypothesis  Opportunistic Behavior Hypothesis 
  
Accruals Quality  +  - 
Persistence  +  + 
Conservatism  +  - 
Informativeness  +  - 
 
A positive (+) sign indicates that CFO financial expertise increases earnings quality while a negative (-) 
sign indicates that CFO financial expertise reduces earnings quality.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics: Financial Expertise of CFOs among the S&P 1500 Firms 
 
Panel A: Pooled Sample 
 
Variable       N           Mean              Std Dev       25th Pct   Median    75th Pct 
CFOAGE      1081     49.9953      6.4312      45     50   54 
CPA         1081      0.4190       0.4936         0                 0          1 
MBA         1081      0.4292       0.4952         0                   0           1 
LENGTH      1081      4.4320       4.4340         1    4    6 
Big-5       1081      0.3089       0.4622         0                   0     1 
 
Panel B: S&P 500 Firms 
 
Variable       N              Mean           Std Dev         25th Pct           Median             75th Pct 
CFOAGE       348     50.8477      5.8425      47   50   55 
CPA          348       0.3305       0.4711         0                   0          1 
MBA          348       0.5345       0.4995         0          1             1 
LENGTH       348       4.1408       4.1873         1     3     6 
Big-5        348       0.2385       0.4268         0                   0               0 
 
Panel C: S&P 400 Firms 
 
Variable       N       Mean                Std Dev            25th Pct            Median             75th Pct 
CFOAGE       282    49.5280       6.4074      45   49       54 
CPA          282      0.4291       0.4958         0                   0          1 
MBA          282      0.4149       0.4936         0                   0           1 
LENGTH       282      4.4468       4.3379         1    4     7 
Big-5        282      0.3369       0.4735         0                   0          1 
 
Panel D: S&P 600 Firms     
 
Variable       N         Mean               Std Dev            25th Pct            Median                75th Pct 
 
CFOAGE       451     49.6297       6.8172      45       49       54 
CPA          451      0.4812       0.5002         0                    0           1 
MBA          451      0.3570       0.4796         0                   0           1 
LENGTH       451      4.6474       4.6688         1      4          6 
Big-5        451      0.3459  0.4762         0                    0           1 
 
 
Notes: 
CFOAGE = the age of the CFO.  
CPA  = a dummy variable set to 1 if the CFO hold a CPA license, and 0 otherwise. 
MBA = a dummy variable set to 1 if the CFO has an advanced degree in business, and 0 
otherwise.  
Length = the number of years the individual has been the CFO of the firm.  
Big-5  = a dummy variable set to 1 if the CFO has previously worked for at least one of 
the Big-5 accounting firms or their predecessors.  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics: Financial Expertise of CFOs by Industry 
 
Panel A: Pooled Sample 
 
Variable       N           Mean             Std Dev           25th Pct            Median            75th Pct 
CFOAGE      1081    49.9954       6.4312      45          50          54  
CPA         1081      0.4191       0.4936         0            0             1  
MBA         1081      0.4292       0.4952         0            0             1  
LENGTH      1081      4.4320       4.4338         1            4             6  
Big-5       1081      0.3090       0.4623         0            0             1  
 
Panel B: Oil and Gas Extraction
 
Variable       N            Mean            Std Dev           25th Pct            Median           75th Pct 
CFOAGE        44       49.2045       5.8492      45.5       49          53  
CPA           44       0.3636       0.4866         0            0            1  
MBA           44       0.4545      0.5037         0            0            1  
LENGTH        44       4.7500       5.6078         0.5          3            6  
Big-5        44       0.2500       0.4380         0            0            0.5 
 
Panel C: Food and Kindred Products
 
Variable       N        Mean           Std Dev         25th Pct             Median          75th Pct 
CFOAGE        36       50.5556      4.8252            47.5       50          53  
CPA           36       0.3056      0.4672             0           0           1  
MBA           36       0.4444      0.5040             0            0           1  
LENGTH        36       4.8889      4.4515             1           4           7.5 
Big-5         36       0.1667      0.3780             0           0           0 
 
Panel D: Chemicals and Allied Products 
 
Variable       N         Mean        Std Dev    25th Pct    Median    75th Pct 
CFOAGE        96      50.4792      6.4742      46        50.5        55.5 
CPA           96        0.4583      0.5009       0         0           1  
MBA           96        0.5313      0.5016       0         1           1  
LENGTH        96        4.5521      3.7944       2         4           7  
Big-5         96        0.3333      0.4739       0         0           1  
 
Panel E: Industrial Machinery & Equipment 
 
Variable       N       Mean        Std Dev    25th Pct    Median    75th Pct 
CFOAGE        77    51.1039      6.3590      46        51          56  
CPA           77      0.3247      0.4713       0         0           1  
MBA           77      0.5584      0.4998       0         1           1  
LENGTH        77      3.4805      3.8886       1         2           5  
Big-5         77      0.2597      0.4414       0         0           1  
 
66 
 
Table 3 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics: Financial Expertise of CFOs by Industry 
 
Panel F: Electronic & Other Electronic Equipment 
 
Variable       N        Mean        Std Dev               25th Pct   Median   75th Pct 
CFOAGE       120      50.1500     6.7720      46          50         55  
CPA          120       0.4083       0.4936       0              0           1   
MBA          120       0.3917       0.4902       0              0           1  
LENGTH       120       4.7083       4.7197       1              4         7.5 
Big-5        120       0.3417       0.4763       0              0            1  
 
Panel G: Transportation Equipment 
 
Variable       N        Mean        Std Dev               25th Pct   Median    75th Pct 
CFOAGE        41      52.1951    7.5803      47        53          59  
CPA           41       0.3902      0.4939       0            0           1  
MBA           41       0.5610      0.5024       0            1           1  
LENGTH        41       5.0244      5.5610       1            3           8  
Big-5         41       0.2439      0.4348       0            0           0 
 
Panel H: Instruments & Related Products 
 
Variable       N        Mean        Std Dev                25th Pct   Median    75th Pct 
CFOAGE        83      50.1205      5.9457      46         50          55  
CPA           83       0.5060        0.5030       0          1           1  
MBA           83       0.4910        0.5030       0          0           1  
LENGTH        83       4.2771        4.4703       0          4           6  
Big-5         83       0.3494        0.4797       0          0           1  
 
Panel I: Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 
 
Variable       N        Mean        Std Dev                 25th Pct   Median   75th Pct 
CFOAGE        35      49.6000      6.5449      46         49         54  
CPA           35       0.4857        0.5071         0             0          1  
MBA           35       0.3143        0.4710         0             0          1  
LENGTH        35       5.3429        5.1845         1             4          6  
Big-5         35       0.2857        0.4583         0             0          1  
 
Panel J: Business Services 
 
Variable       N        Mean        Std Dev                 25th Pct   Median   75th Pct 
CFOAGE       135      47.9185      6.8022      44         47         52  
CPA          135       0.4519        0.4995         0           0           1  
MBA          135       0.4444        0.4988         0           0           1  
LENGTH       135       4.0370        4.2592         0           3           6  
Big-5        135       0.3333        0.4732         0           0           1  
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics: Accruals Quality Sample 
 
 Panel A: Pooled Sample (N=1251)
 
 Variable        Mean          Std Dev 25th Pct       Median        75th Pct
 
ABSACC    0.0240        0.0279        0.0079        0.0163        0.0320 
SIZE            7.1523        1.4889        6.1529        6.9011        8.0123 
LEV            0.4625        0.2127        0.3017        0.4650        0.6004 
GROWTH   0.1639        0.2247        0.0550        0.1168        0.2253 
ROA            0.0662       0.0818        0.0349        0.0674        0.1053 
AUD            0.9608        0.1941        1.0000        1.0000        1.0000 
LOSS           0.0983       0.2979                0                0                0 
CPA            0.3653        0.4817                0                0        1.0000 
MBA           0.4005        0.4902                0                0        1.0000 
LENGTH    6.7858        4.1187        4.0000        5.0000        8.0000 
CFOAGE    51.0935        6.2797       47.0000       51.0000       56.0000
 
Panel B: S&P 500 Firms (N=373) 
 
Variable        Mean          Std Dev        25th Pct        Median        75th Pct 
 
ABSACC    0.0179        0.0158        0.0064        0.0132        0.0249 
SIZE           8.8282        1.1098        7.9339        8.6791        9.6081 
LEV            0.5345        0.1985        0.4051        0.5376        0.6692 
GROWTH   0.1333        0.1602        0.0550        0.1054        0.1772 
ROA            0.0786        0.0760        0.0494        0.0802        0.1171 
AUD            0.9946        0.0731        1.0000        1.0000        1.0000 
LOSS           0.0563        0.2308                0                0                0 
CPA            0.2547        0.4363                0                0        1.0000 
MBA           0.5764        0.4948                0        1.0000        1.0000 
LENGTH    6.5845        4.1880        4.0000        5.0000        8.0000 
CFOAGE    52.4531        5.2154       49.0000       52.0000       56.0000
 
Panel C: S&P 400 Firms (N=322) 
 
 Variable     Mean        Std Dev        25th Pct       Median        75th Pct 
 
ABSACC    0.0245        0.0260        0.0076       0.0170        0.0326 
SIZE            7.1472        0.7957        6.5859        7.1330        7.7756 
LEV            0.4788        0.2345        0.3071        0.5038        0.6112 
GROWTH   0.1701        0.2398        0.0548        0.1263        0.2268 
ROA            0.0638        0.0757        0.0338        0.0619        0.1029 
AUD            0.9752        0.1559        1.0000        1.0000        1.0000 
LOSS           0.0994        0.2996                0                0                0 
CPA            0.3913        0.4888                0                0        1.0000 
MBA           0.3447        0.4760                0                0        1.0000 
LENGTH    6.6584        3.3509        4.0000      6.0000        9.0000 
CFOAGE    49.6801      6.2213       46.0000       49.5000       54.0000
 
68 
 
Table 4 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics: Accruals Quality Sample  
 
Panel D: S&P 600 Firms (N=556) 
 
Variable        Mean          Std Dev        25th Pct        Median        75th Pct 
 
ABSACC          0.0279        0.0340        0.0090       0.0179        0.0366 
SIZE            6.0309        0.8086        5.4667        6.1435        6.6425 
LEV             0.4048        0.1917        0.2578        0.4114        0.5264 
GROWTH         0.1808        0.2496        0.0552        0.1281        0.2535 
ROA             0.0592        0.0880        0.0257        0.0599        0.0969 
AUD             0.9299        0.2556        1.0000        1.0000        1.0000 
LOSS            0.1259        0.3320               0                0                0 
CPA             0.4245        0.4947               0                0         1.0000 
MBA            0.3147        0.4648               0                0         1.0000 
LENGTH          6.9946        4.4582        4.0000        5.0000        9.0000 
CFOAGE        51.0000        6.7669       46.0000       51.0000       56.0000
 
 
Notes: 
ABSACC  = the absolute value of residuals from Equation [1] 
SIZE  = the natural log of the firm’s total asset.  
LEV  = the firm’s total liability divided by total assets.  
GROWTH = growth rate as measured by changes in total sales.  
ROA  = net income divided by the average total asset.  
AUD  = a dummy variable set to 1 if the financial report was audited by one of the 
Big-4 auditors, and 0 otherwise.  
LOSS  = a dummy variable set to 1 if the net income is negative, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Other variables have been previously defined.  
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics: Earnings Persistence Sample
 
Panel A: Pooled Sample
 
Variable       N          Mean        Std Dev      25th Pct          Median       75th Pct
 
Xt-1         1297    0.0645     0.0784        0.0306        0.0638        0.1029 
Xt           1297    0.0716     0.0795        0.0382        0.0702        0.1082 
CPA          1297    0.3840     0.4865          0                0        1.0000 
MBA          1297    0.4056     0.4912          0                0        1.0000 
LENGTH       1297    6.1534     4.1706        3.0000        5.0000        8.0000 
CFOAGE       1297  50.8234     6.1989       47.0000       50.0000       55.0000 
BTE          1297    0.0665     0.1249        0.0018        0.0244        0.0862 
CAP          1297    0.0510     0.0529        0.0230        0.0371        0.0582 
SIZE         1297    7.5953     1.4657        6.4927        7.3625        8.5120 
GROWTH       1297    0.1719     0.2383        0.0592        0.1256        0.2365 
LOSS         1297    0.1018     0.3025          0                0                0
 
Panel B: S&P 500 Firms 
 
Variable      N          Mean        Std Dev     25th Pct          Median       75th Pct 
Xt-1           420       0.0726       0.0705        0.0423        0.0738        0.1065 
Xt            420       0.0878       0.0701        0.0505        0.0834        0.1196 
CPA           420       0.2881       0.4534               0                0        1.0000 
MBA           420       0.5571       0.4973               0        1.0000        1.0000 
LENGTH        420       5.6952       4.0158        3.0000        4.0000        7.0000 
CFOAGE        420      51.7571      5.4657       48.0000       51.0000       56.0000 
BTE           420      0.0719       0.1002        0.0076        0.0340        0.1046 
CAP           420      0.0512       0.0511        0.0253        0.0384        0.0567 
SIZE          420      9.2412       1.0613        8.4985        9.0608        9.7431 
GROWTH        420      0.1377       0.1610        0.0532        0.1039        0.1865 
LOSS          420      0.0643       0.2456               0                0 0 
 
Panel C: S&P 400 Firms 
 
Variable      N          Mean        Std Dev      25th Pct          Median       75th Pct 
Xt-1           326      0.0638      0.0750        0.0318        0.0634        0.1029 
Xt            326      0.0653      0.0730        0.0372        0.0633        0.1037 
CPA           326      0.4233      0.4948               0                0        1.0000 
MBA           326      0.3681      0.4830               0                0        1.0000 
LENGTH        326      6.4172      3.8171        4.0000        5.0000        9.0000 
CFOAGE        326      50.1994    6.2806       46.0000       50.0000       55.0000 
BTE           326      0.0604      0.1377               0        0.0150       0.0547 
CAP           326      0.0573      0.0653        0.0225        0.0378       0.0648 
SIZE          326      7.5581      0.5754        7.1494        7.5887        7.9825 
GROWTH        326       0.1915     0.2775        0.0676        0.1458        0.2456 
LOSS          326       0.1043     0.3061               0                0  0
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics: Earnings Persistence Sample 
 
Panel D: S&P 600 Firms 
 
Variable      N       Mean        Std Dev       25th Pct          Median       75th Pct 
Xt-1           551     0.0588      0.0854        0.0234        0.0558        0.0980 
Xt            551     0.0631      0.0877        0.0281        0.0630        0.1023 
CPA           551     0.4338      0.4960               0                0        1.0000 
MBA           551     0.3122      0.4638               0                0        1.0000 
LENGTH        551     6.3466      4.4556        3.0000        5.0000        8.0000 
CFOAGE        551  50.4810       6.5928       46.0000       50.0000       55.0000 
BTE           551    0.0660       0.1336        0.0021        0.0233        0.0865 
CAP           551    0.0471       0.0452        0.0205        0.0352        0.0556 
SIZE          551    6.3628       0.6459        5.9442        6.4118        6.8120 
GROWTH        551    0.1865       0.2594        0.0622        0.1342        0.2605 
LOSS          551    0.1289       0.3353               0                0                0 
 
 
Notes: 
X  = income before extraordinary items deflated by average total assets.  
 CAP  = capital expenditure as measured by the amount of depreciation, depletion, and 
amortization, deflated by total sales.  
 BTE  = the barrier to entry as measured by the research and development expenses and 
advertising expenses, deflated by total sales.   
 
All other variables have been previously defined.   
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics: Conservatism Sample 
 
Panel A: Pooled Sample 
 
Variable      N       Mean       Std Dev       25th Pct          Median       75th Pct 
NI           1137   0.0469    0.0578        0.0301        0.0491        0.0656 
DR           1137   0.3298    0.4704               0                0        1.0000 
R            1137   0.1694    0.3542       -0.0595        0.1041        0.3250 
CPA          1137   0.3791    0.4854               0                0        1.0000 
MBA          1137   0.3782    0.4851               0                0        1.0000 
LENGTH       1137   6.8883    4.0816        4.0000        5.0000        9.0000 
CFOAGE       1137 51.2938    6.2372       47.0000       51.0000       56.0000
 
Panel B: S&P 500 Firms 
 
Variable      N       Mean       Std Dev       25th Pct          Median       75th Pct 
NI            353     0.0522   0.0641        0.0356        0.0517        0.0656 
DR            353     0.3097   0.4630               0                0        1.0000 
R             353     0.1395   0.2954       -0.0372        0.0863        0.2492 
CPA           353     0.2756   0.4474               0                0        1.0000 
MBA           353     0.5426   0.4989               0        1.0000        1.0000 
LENGTH        353     6.5313   3.9576        4.0000        5.0000        8.0000 
CFOAGE        353   52.4006   5.3131       49.0000       52.0000       57.0000
Panel C: S&P 400 Firms 
 
Variable      N       Mean        Std Dev       25th Pct          Median       75th Pct 
NI            302   0.0430      0.0434        0.0276        0.0469        0.0642 
DR            302   0.3377      0.4737               0                0        1.0000 
R             302   0.1559      0.3220       -0.0583        0.1006        0.3143 
CPA           302   0.4205      0.4945               0                0        1.0000 
MBA           302   0.3245      0.4690               0                0        1.0000 
LENGTH        302   7.0430      3.6529        4.0000        6.0000        9.0000 
CFOAGE        302 50.3907      6.2718       46.0000       50.0000       55.0000
Panel D: S&P 600 Firms
 
Variable      N      Mean        Std Dev       25th Pct          Median       75th Pct 
NI            483    0.0455       0.0606        0.0282        0.0472        0.0660 
DR            483    0.3395       0.4740               0                0        1.0000 
R             483    0.1995       0.4070       -0.0793        0.1242        0.4000 
CPA           483    0.4286       0.4954               0                0        1.0000 
MBA           483    0.2919       0.4551               0                0        1.0000 
LENGTH        483    7.0518       4.4033        4.0000        5.0000        9.0000 
CFOAGE        483  51.0518       6.7159       46.0000       51.0000       56.0000
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Notes: 
NI = EPS from continuing operation deflated by stock price at the beginning of the 
period. 
R = holding period return for 12-months for year t, ending 3 months after the fiscal year 
end.  
DR = a dummy variable set to 1 if RET < 0, and 0 otherwise.  
All other variables have been previously defined.  
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics: Informativeness Sample 
 
Panel A: Pooled Sample  
 
Variable    N         Mean         Std Dev       25th Pct         Median       75th Pct 
R                1312       0.1650        0.3413       -0.0582        0.1063        0.3228 
NI               1312       0.0502        0.0542        0.0340        0.0515        0.0686 
SIZE          1312       7.3990        1.4531        6.3821        7.1912        8.3080 
LEV           1312       0.4706        0.2012        0.3221        0.4796        0.6004 
BM             1312      0.4057        0.2202        0.2503        0.3672        0.5280 
AUD          1312       0.9566        0.2039        1.0000        1.0000        1.0000 
LOSS         1312      0.0739        0.2618               0                0 0 
MBA          1312      0.3963        0.4893               0                0        1.0000 
CPA           1312      0.3887        0.4876               0                0        1.0000 
LENGTH  1312      6.1829        4.1643        3.0000        5.0000        8.0000 
CFOAGE  1312      50.9253        6.2241      47.0000       51.0000       56.0000
 Panel B: S&P 500 Firms                                
 
Variable     N        Mean         Std Dev       25th Pct          Median       75th Pct 
R                421       0.1464        0.2967       -0.0335        0.0898        0.2566 
NI              421       0.0593        0.0462        0.0400        0.0533        0.0685 
SIZE          421       8.9463        1.1061        8.1020        8.8616        9.6466 
LEV           421       0.5352        0.1925        0.4096        0.5376        0.6616 
BM            421       0.3273        0.1822        0.2018        0.2900        0.4316 
AUD         421        0.9929        0.0842        1.0000        1.0000        1.0000 
LOSS        421        0.0190        0.1367                0                0                0 
MBA         421       0.5534        0.4977                0        1.0000        1.0000 
CPA           421       0.2874        0.4531                0                0        1.0000 
LENGTH  421        5.7150        3.9999        3.0000        5.0000        7.0000 
CFOAGE  421      `51.9335        5.4507       48.0000       52.0000       56.0000 
 
Panel C: S&P 400 Firms 
 
Variable     N        Mean         Std Dev       25th Pct         Median       75th Pct 
R                341       0.1531        0.3187       -0.0577        0.1013        0.3143 
NI              341       0.0450        0.0496        0.0315        0.0502        0.0663 
SIZE          341       7.3396        0.7438        6.7595        7.3056        7.9157 
LEV           341       0.4821        0.2097        0.3223        0.5057        0.6202 
BM             341       0.3869        0.1942        0.2494        0.3610        0.5027 
AUD          341       0.9736        0.1605        1.0000        1.0000        1.0000 
LOSS         341       0.0792        0.2704               0                0                0 
MBA          341       0.3607     0.4809               0                0        1.0000 
CPA            341       0.4164        0.4937               0                0        1.0000 
LENGTH   341       6.4457        3.7995        4.0000        5.0000        9.0000 
CFOAGE   341       50.2053        6.2773       46.0000       50.0000       55.0000
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Table 7 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics: Informativeness Sample  
 
Panel D: S&P 600 Firms 
 
Variable      N       Mean             Std Dev            25th Pct          Median      75th Pct 
R             550       0.1866        0.3835       -0.0771        0.1258        0.3809 
NI            550       0.0464        0.0613        0.0298        0.0501        0.0708 
SIZE          550       6.2515        0.7789        5.7192        6.3133        6.8059 
LEV           550       0.4141       0.1860        0.2733        0.4094       0.5360 
BM            550       0.4774        0.2386        0.2995       0.4461        0.6131 
AUD           550       0.9182        0.2743        1.0000        1.0000        1.0000 
LOSS          550       0.1127        0.3165                0                0                0 
MBA           550       0.2982        0.4579                0                0         1.0000 
CPA           550       0.4491        0.4979                0                0         1.0000 
LENGTH        550       6.3782        4.4699        3.0000        5.0000       8.0000 
CFOAGE       550      50.6000        6.6458       46.0000       50.0000       56.0000  
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Table 8 
Spearman\Pearson Correlation Matrix – Accruals Quality 
 
 
 
ABSACC SIZE LEV GROWTH ROA AUD LOSS CPA MBA LENGTH CFOAGE 
ABSACC 1 -0.171 -0.033 0.059 -0.08 -0.071 0.063 0.056 -0.036 -0.002 -0.041 
(0.0000) (0.1955) (0.0214) (0.0019) (0.0058) (0.0143) (0.0293) (0.1608) (0.9445) (0.1149) 
SIZE -0.181 0.481 -0.166 -0.016 0.176 -0.098 -0.16 0.234 -0.006 0.160 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5298) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8273) (0.0000) 
LEV -0.054 0.503 -0.099 -0.246 0.101 0.114 -0.069 0.118 -0.094 0.054 
(0.0374) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0075) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0357) 
GROWTH 0.082 -0.153 -0.167 0.196 -0.074 -0.124 -0.013 0.016 -0.03 -0.096 
(0.0015) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0041) (0.0000) (0.6060) (0.5256) (0.2427) (0.0002) 
ROA 0.026 -0.043 -0.296 0.308 -0.068 -0.632 -0.02 -0.016 0.018 0.019 
(0.3126) (0.0977) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0084) (0.0000) (0.4340) (0.5488) (0.4751) (0.4680) 
AUD -0.056 0.177 0.107 -0.05 -0.044 0.016 -0.059 0.023 -0.065 0.017 
(0.0296) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0506) (0.0892) (0.5332) (0.0214) (0.3830) (0.0116) (0.5142) 
LOSS 0.05 -0.095 0.092 -0.175 -0.521 0.016 0.018 0.001 -0.031 -0.046 
(0.0557) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5332) (0.4852) (0.9861) (0.2262) (0.0780) 
CPA 0.057 -0.148 -0.55 0.005 -0.036 -0.059 0.018 -0.156 -0.057 -0.147 
(0.0266) (0.0000) (0.0346) (0.8519) (0.1682) (0.0214) (0.4852) (0.0000) (0.0270) (0.0000) 
MBA -0.05 0.209 0.116 0.006 -0.029 0.023 0.001 -0.156 -0.087 0.118 
(0.0521) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8099) (0.2695) (0.3830) (0.9861) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0000) 
LENGTH -0.04 -0.031 -0.086 0.007 0.014 -0.06 -0.025 -0.077 -0.118 0.320 
(0.1638) (0.2273) (0.0009) (0.7968) (0.5818) (0.0203) (0.3311) (0.0030) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CFOAGE -0.045 0.146 0.071 -0.099 -0.009 -0.002 -0.052 -0.145 0.1267 0.270  
(0.0557) (0.0000) (0.0057) (0.0000) 0.7145 0.9328 (0.0449) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
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Table 9 
Spearman\Pearson Correlation Matrix - Persistence 
 
 
 
 
Xt Xt+1 CPA MBA LENGTH CFOAGE SIZE CAP BTE GROWTH LOSS 
Xt 
0.679 -0.052 0.012 0.027 0.070 0.28 -0.199 -0.213 0.0156 -0.61 
(0.0000) (0.0286) (0.6279) (0.2590) (0.0034) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5139) (0.0000) 
Xt+1 
0.736 -0.08 0.032 0.032 0.079 0.32 -0.127 -0.228 0.112 -0.376 
(0.0000) (0.0008) (0.1789) (0.1868) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CPA -0.057 -0.077 -0.157 -0.069 -0.161 -0.118 -0.046 0.048 0.022 0.017 (0.0172) (0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0039) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0507) (0.0460) (0.3617) (0.4646) 
MBA 0.026 0.036 -0.157 -0.112 0.116 0.184 0.073 0.097 -0.006 0.006 (0.2693) (0.1304) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0022) (0.0000) (0.7893) (0.8144) 
LENGTH 0.067 0.052 -0.088 -0.138 0.307 -0.023 -0.027 -0.047 0.041 -0.033 (0.0047) (0.0304) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3311) (0.2570) (0.0510) (0.0862) (0.1638) 
CFOAGE 0.103 0.100 -0.158 0.124 0.247  0.086 -0.055 -0.069 -0.100 -0.035 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.003) (0.0213) (0.0040) (0.0000) (0.1432) 
SIZE 0.387 0.398 -0.132 0.205 -0.014 0.092 -0.004 -0.004 -0.017 -0.223 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5623) (0.0000) (0.8694) (0.8633) (0.4638) (0.0000) 
CAP -0.287 -0.244 -0.02 0.002 0.03 -0.105 -0.005 0.263 0.062 0.228 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4051) (0.9332) (0.2065) (0.0000) (0.8247) (0.0000) (0.0090) (0.0000) 
BTE -0.263 -0.3 0.001 0.072 -0.009 -0.044 0.038 0.289 -0.022 0.163 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9712) (0.0025) (0.6994) (0.0642) (0.1075) (0.0000) (0.3661) (0.0000) 
GROWTH 0.023 0.158 0.021 0.002 -0.008 -0.076 -0.058 0.168 0.198 -0.013 (0.3412) (0.0000) (0.3748) (0.9178) (0.7419) (0.0011) 0.0156  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5747) 
LOSS -0.62 -0.424 0.017 0.006 -0.017 -0.037 -0.213 0.221 0.232 -0.074 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4646) (0.8144) (0.4750) (0.1233) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0018) 
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Table 10 
Spearman/Pearson Correlation Matrix - Conservatism 
 
 
 
NI DR R SIZE CPA MBA LENGTH CFOAGE 
NI -0.197 0.213 0.159 -0.039 -0.020 0.052 0.047 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1360) (0.4512q) (0.0478) (0.0768) 
DR -0.256 -0.651 -0.057 0.033 -0.037 0.004 0.014 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0312) (0.2146) (0.1567) (0.8709) (0.5852) 
R 0.280 -0.815 -0.027 0.021 -0.002 0.027 -0.005 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3111) (0.4161) (0.9416) (0.2770) (0.8576) 
SIZE 0.244 -0.079 0.002 -0.141 0.213 -0.011 0.1375 
(0.0000) (0.0027) (0.3255) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6684) (0.0000) 
CPA -0.038 0.033 -0.001 -0.124 -0.162 -0.076 -0.152 
(0.1455) (0.2146) (0.8322) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0037) (0.0000) 
MBA -0.006 -0.037 -0.006 0.195 -0.162 -0.131 0.079 
(0.8275) (0.1567) (0.8157) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0026) 
LENGTH 0.048 0.004 0.024 -0.011 -0.090 -0.157 0.343 
(0.0660) (0.8828) (0.3604) (0.6755) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CFOAGE 0.074 0.011 -0.015 0.1366 -0.1533 0.08182 0.307 
 
(0.0049) (0.6657) (0.5792) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.0000)  
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Table 11 
Spearman / Pearson Correlation Matrix – Earnings Informativeness 
 
 
R NI SIZE LEV BM AUD LOSS CPA MBA LENGTH CFOAGE 
R 0.234 -0.040 -0.021 -0.196 -0.038 -0.129 0.019 -0.023 0.034 -0.003 (0.0000) (0.1278) (0.4143) (0.0000) (0.1531) (0.0000) (0.4650) (0.3884) (0.1925) (0.0238) 
NI 0.345 0.175 0.011 -0.047 0.018 -0.639 -0.025 -0.024 0.055 0.056 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5550) (0.0718) (0.4899) (0.0000) (0.3450) (0.3636) (0.0376) (0.0333) 
SIZE 0.029 0.2353 0.452 -0.074 0.172 -0.157 -0.141 0.212 -0.013 0.138 (0.2724) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0050) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6170) (0.0000) 
LEV 0.001 0.204 0.483 -0.116 0.089 0.078 -0.042 0.097 -0.078 0.059 (0.9790) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0031) (0.1095) (0.0002) (0.0031) (0.0242) 
BM -0.19 0.014 -0.076 -0.068 -0.088 0.175 0.072 -0.023 0.063 0.064 (0.0000) (0.5958) (0.0039) (0.0101) (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0050) (0.3888) (0.0167) (0.0146) 
AUD -0.025 0.004 0.181 0.093 -0.067 -0.001 -0.048 0.028 -0.112 -0.020 (0.3425) (0.8925) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0103) (0.9746) (0.0695) (0.2872) (0.0000) (0.4392) 
LOSS -0.174 -0.479 -0.16 0.056 0.133 -0.001  0.047 0.005 -0.074 -0.028 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0333) (0.0000) (0.9746)  (0.0750) (0.8590) (0.0049) (0.2831) 
CPA -0.006 -0.038 -0.129 -0.035 0.071 -0.048 0.047 -0.156 -0.077 -0.157 (0.8142) (0.1530) (0.0000) (0.1775) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0750) (0.0000) (0.0033) (0.0000) 
MBA -0.002 -0.011 0.194 0.097 -0.029 0.028 0.005 -0.158 -0.128 0.081 (0.9343) (0.6775) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.2762) (0.2872) (0.8598) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0020) 
LENGTH 0.026 0.058 -0.015 -0.063 0.031 -0.084 -0.071 -0.092 -0.152 0.342 (0.3274) (0.0272) (0.5749) (0.0159) (0.2327) (0.0014) (0.0073) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CFOAGE -0.011 0.076 0.137 0.076 0.059 0.007 -0.039 -0.158 0.084 0.306 
 
(0.6795) (0.0039) (0.0000) (0.0038) (0.0239) (0.7776) (0.1377) (0.0000) (0.0013) (0.0000)  
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Table 12 
Multivariate Analysis of Accruals Quality and CFO Financial Expertise (Model 1) 
 
Model: AB_ACCRit = β0 + β1CPAit + β2MBAit + β3LENGTHit +β4CFOGEit + β5SIZEit  
+ β6ROAit + β7 LEVit +β8LOSSit + β9GROWTHit + β10AUDit + εit  
 
Panel A: Pooled Regression                                     
 
Independent Expected     Parameter     Standard   
Variable       Signs       Estimate       Error     t Value     Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept      ?  0.0342       0.0085        4.02       <.0001 
CPA            ?  0.0007       0.0017        0.41       0.6848 
MBA            ?  -.0018       0.0017       -1.09       0.2751 
LENGTH         ?  0.0001       0.0002        0.68       0.4943 
CFOAGE         ?  0.0002       0.0001        1.30       0.1947 
SIZE           -  -.0029       0.0006       -4.65      <.0001 
ROA           ?  0.0006       0.0125        0.05       0.9623 
LEV            +  0.0103       0.0043        2.38       0.0174 
LOSS           +  0.0035       0.0034        1.03       0.3052 
GROWTH        +  0.0108       0.0035        3.06       0.0022 
AUD            -  -.0086       0.0041       -2.12       0.0340 
 
N=1251   R-square= 0.0708 
Panel B: S&P 500 Firms 
 
Independent Expected     Parameter        Standard 
Variable       Signs        Estimate           Error      t Value     Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept      ?  0.0317       0.0165         1.91      0.0563 
CPA            ?  0.0007      0.0021        0.34       0.7345 
MBA            ?  -.0026       0.0019       -1.35       0.1788 
LENGTH        ?  0.0002       0.0002         1.06      0.2884 
CFOAGE          ?  -.0003       0.0002       -1.79       0.0744 
SIZE           -  -.0011       0.0009       -1.29       0.1981 
ROA            ?  0.0215       0.0150         1.44      0.1511 
LEV            +  -.0005       0.0049       -0.09       0.9254 
LOSS           +  0.0027       0.0048         0.57      0.5721 
GROWTH        +  -.0063       0.0054       -1.16       0.2451 
AUD            -  0.0131       0.0115         1.14      0.2552 
 
N=373  R-square = 0.0440 
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Table 12 (Continued) 
Multivariate Analysis of Accruals Quality and CFO Financial Expertise (Model 1) 
 
Model: AB_ACCRit = β0 + β1CPAit + β2MBAit + β3LENGTHit +β4CFOAGEit + β5SIZEit  
+ β6ROAit + β7 LEVit +β8LOSSit + β9GROWTHit + β10AUDit + εit  
 
Panel C: S&P 400 Firms 
 
Independent  Expected    Parameter       Standard 
Variable       Signs       Estimate          Error      t Value     Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept      ?  0.0718       0.0207        3.46       0.0006 
CPA            ?  -.0028       0.0029       -0.94       0.3466 
MBA            ?  -.0009       0.0031       -0.30       0.7646 
LENGTH         ?  -.0008       0.0004       -1.82       0.0700 
CFOAGE         ?  -.0001       0.0002       -0.25       0.8064 
SIZE           -  -.0019       0.0021       -0.91       0.3613 
ROA            ?  0.0508       0.0256        1.99       0.0478 
LEV            +  0.0106       0.0069        1.54       0.1247 
LOSS           +   0.0083       0.0062        1.35       0.1795 
GROWTH         +  0.0063       0.0059        1.06       0.2900 
AUD            -  -.0396       0.0092       -4.31       <.0001 
 
N=322   R-square = 0.1731 
 
Panel D: S&P 600 Firms 
 
Independent Expected Parameter       Standard 
Variable       Signs  Estimate        Error       t Value     Pr > |t| 
 
 Intercept      ?  0.0158       0.0170        0.92       0.3556 
 CPA            ?  0.0007       0.0029        0.24       0.8114 
 MBA            ?  -.0018       0.0032       -0.55       0.5813 
 LENGTH         ?  0.0004       0.0004        1.11       0.2679 
 CFOAGE         ?  0.0004       0.0002        1.64       0.1009 
 SIZE           -  -.0028       0.0023       -1.21       0.2275 
 ROA            ?  -.0312       0.0222       -1.41       0.1600 
 LEV            +  0.0084       0.0095        0.88       0.3804 
 LOSS           +  0.0024       0.0057        0.43       0.6702 
 GROWTH        +  0.0208       0.0061        3.43       0.0006 
 AUD            -  -.0029       0.0058       -0.50       0.6157 
 
N=556  R-square = 0.0679 
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Table 13 
Multivariate Analysis of Accruals Quality and CFO Financial Expertise (Model 2) 
 
Model: AB_ACCRit = β0 + β1CPAit + β2MBAit + β3LENGTHit +β4CFOGEit  
+ β5CPA*LENGTHit + β6MBA*LENGTHit + β7SIZEit + β8ROAit   
+ β9LEVit +β10LOSSit + β11GROWTHit + β12AUDit + εit   
 
Panel A: Pooled Regression                                     
 
Independent Expected     Parameter      Standard   
Variable       Signs       Estimate        Error      t Value     Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept            ?  0.0328        0.0087        3.78       0.0002 
CPA                  ?  0.0081        0.0031       2.59       0.0098 
MBA                  ?  0.0000        0.0030        0.01       0.9934 
LENGTH               ?  0.0006        0.0003        2.11       0.0349 
CFOAGE               ?  0.0001        0.0001       0.92       0.3579 
CPA*LENGTH     ?  -.0011        0.0004       -2.78       0.0056 
MBA*LENGTH   ?  -.0002        0.0004       -0.59       0.5560 
SIZE                 -  -.0029        0.0006       -4.55       <.0001 
ROA                  ?  0.0020        0.0125        0.16       0.8703 
LEV                  +  0.0102        0.0043        2.37       0.0178 
LOSS                 +  0.0035        0.0033        1.03       0.3023 
GROWTH              +  0.0104       0.0035        2.94       0.0034 
AUD                  -  -.0085        0.0041       -2.08       0.0373 
 
N=1251   R-square= 0.0767 
Panel B: S&P 500 Firms 
 
Independent Expected     Parameter         Standard 
Variable       Signs        Estimate            Error      t Value     Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept            ?  0.0341        0.0170        2.01       0.0456 
CPA                  ?  0.0005        0.0038        0.14       0.8907 
MBA                  ?  -.0055        0.0037       -1.48       0.1394 
LENGTH               ?  -.0001        0.0005       -0.18       0.8558 
CFOAGE               ?  -.0003        0.0002       -1.81       0.0704 
CPA*LENGTH     ?  -.0000       0.0005       -0.04       0.9667 
MBA*LENGTH    ?  0.0004        0.0005        0.93       0.3540 
SIZE                 -  -.0011        0.0009       -1.24       0.2150 
ROA                  ?  0.0201        0.0150        1.33       0.1827 
LEV                  +  -.0009        0.0049       -0.19       0.8479 
LOSS                 +  0.0025        0.0048        0.52       0.6009 
GROWTH              +  -.0061        0.0054       -1.12       0.2622 
AUD                  -  0.0131        0.0115        1.14       0.2570 
 
N=373  R-square = 0.0465 
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Table 13 (Continued) 
Multivariate Analysis of Accruals Quality and CFO Financial Expertise (Model 2) 
 
Model: AB_ACCRit = β0 + β1CPAit + β2MBAit + β3LENGTHit +β4CFOAGEit  
+ β5CPA*LENGTHit + β6MBA*LENGTHit + β7SIZEit + β8ROAit   
+ β9LEVit +β10LOSSit + β11GROWTHit + β12AUDit + εit  
 
Panel C: S&P 400 Firms 
 
Independent  Expected     Parameter        Standard 
Variable       Signs        Estimate           Error      t Value     Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept            ?   0.0755       0.0207        3.64       0.0003 
CPA                  ?   -.0006       0.0063       -0.09       0.9295 
MBA                  ?   -.0133       0.0064       -2.08       0.0388 
LENGTH               ?   -.0013       0.0006       -2.12       0.0344 
CFOAGE               ?   -.0001       0.0002       -0.26       0.7946 
CPA*LENGTH     ?   -.0004       0.0009       -0.48       0.6303 
MBA*LENGTH    ?   0.0020       0.0009        2.21       0.0276 
SIZE                 -   -.0020       0.0021       -0.95       0.3417 
ROA                  ?   0.0545       0.0256        2.13       0.0342 
LEV                  +   0.0127       0.0069        1.83       0.0675 
LOSS                 +   0.0081       0.0061        1.32       0.1868 
GROWTH              +   0.0059       0.0059        0.99       0.3231 
AUD                  -   -.0402       0.0092       -4.39       <.0001 
 
N=322   R-square = 0.1863 
 
Panel D: S&P 600 Firms 
 
Independent Expected  Parameter       Standard 
Variable       Signs   Estimate        Error       t Value     Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept            ?   0.0150       0.0171        0.88       0.3805 
CPA                  ?   0.0157       0.0055        2.88       0.0042 
MBA                  ?   0.0069       0.0059        1.17       0.2428 
LENGTH               ?   0.0016       0.0005        3.23       0.0013 
CFOAGE               ?   0.0002       0.0002        0.84       0.3990 
CPA*LENGTH     ?   -.0022       0.0006       -3.24       0.0012 
MBA*LENGTH    ?   -.0013       0.0008       -1.63       0.1040 
SIZE                 -   -.0026       0.0022       -1.16       0.2452 
ROA                  ?   -.0280       0.0220       -1.28       0.2023 
LEV                  +   0.0077       0.0095        0.81       0.4174 
LOSS                 +   0.0025       0.0057        0.44       0.6576 
GROWTH              +   0.0203       0.0060        3.38       0.0008 
AUD                   -   -.0015       0.0057       -0.26       0.7986 
 
N=556  R-square = 0.0894 
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Table 14  
Multivariate Analysis of Accruals Quality and CFO Financial Expertise (Model 3-7) 
 
Model: AB_ACCRit = β0 + β1Expertise + β2SIZEit + β3ROAit + β4 LEVit +β5LOSSit  
+ β6GROWTHit + β7AUDit + εit  
 
Pooled Sample 
 
Independent     Model 3   Model 4   Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Variables  
Intercept 7.94 8.15 7.58 4.48 4.47 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CPA 0.39 - - - - 
0.6951 - - - - 
MBA - -1.07 - - - 
- 0.2837 - - - 
LENGTH - - 1.25 - - 
- - 0.2108 - - 
CFOAGE - - - 1.52 1.53 
- - - 0.1287 0.1261 
EXPERT - - - - -0.21 
0.8364 
SIZE -4.74 -4.5 -4.89 -4.97 -4.97 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ROA 0.04 0.05 0.06 0 0.01 
0.9685 0.9635 0.9484 0.9964 0.9918 
LEV 2.32 2.34 2.44 2.29 2.30 
0.0203 0.0193 0.0148 0.0220 0.0218 
LOSS 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.89 
0.3886 0.3644 0.3649 0.3766 0.3747 
GROWTH 2.99 3.03 3.02 3.09 3.09 
0.0028 0.0025 0.0026 0.0020 0.0020 
AUD -2.2 -2.24 -2.13 -2.2 -2.21 
0.0279 0.0252 0.0330 0.0280 0.0276 
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Table 15 
Multivariate Analysis of Earnings Persistence & CFO Financial Expertise (Model 1) 
Model: Xi,t  = β0 + β1 Xi ,t-1 + β2 Xi ,t-1*CPAit + β3 Xi ,t-1*MBAit + β4 Xi ,t-1*LENGTHit  
+ β5 Xi ,t-1*CFOAGEit +Β6 Xi ,t-1*BTEi,t + β7 Xi ,t-1*CAPi,t + β8 Xi ,t-1*SIZEi,t  
+ β9 Xi ,t-1*GROWTH,t + β10 Xi ,t-1*LOSS,t + Fixed Effects + εi,t 
Panel A: Pooled Sample
Indep. Var.  Expected Sign    Estimate         Std. Error     t Value     Pr > |t
 
Intercept         ?   0.0098       0.0027        3.59       0.0003 
Xi ,t-1                +  0.6171       0.1571        3.93       <.0001 
Xi ,t-1*CPA          ?   0.0686       0.0340        2.02       0.0439 
Xi ,t-1*MBA         ?  -0.0164       0.0351       -0.47       0.6399 
Xi ,t-1*LENGTH       ?   0.0051       0.0044        1.16       0.2460 
Xi ,t-1*CFOAGE      ?  -0.0033       0.0028       -1.17       0.2434 
Xi ,t-1*BTE          +  -0.1463       0.0930       -1.57       0.1158 
Xi ,t-1*CAP          +   1.3198       0.3169        4.17       <.0001 
Xi ,t-1*SIZE          +  0.0335       0.0109        3.08       0.0021 
Xi ,t-1*GROWTH       +   0.2956       0.0675        4.38       <.0001 
Xi ,t-1*LOSS        -  -0.6175       0.0699       -8.84       <.0001 
 
N = 1297  R-square = 0.4980 
Panel B: S&P 500 Firms
Indep. Var.  Expected Sign    Estimate         Std. Error     t Value     Pr > |t 
 
Intercept          ?  0.0158       0.0046        3.45       0.0006 
Xi ,t-1                 +  1.0856       0.3287        3.30       0.0010 
Xi ,t-1*CPA          ?  -0.0808       0.0578       -1.40       0.1629 
Xi ,t-1*MBA         ?  -0.0094       0.0530       -0.18       0.8589 
Xi ,t-1*LENGTH      ?  -0.0032       0.0077       -0.42       0.6775 
Xi ,t-1*CFOAGE       ?   0.0006       0.0055        0.11       0.9111 
Xi ,t-1*BTE          +   0.4037       0.2724        1.48       0.1392 
Xi ,t-1*CAP          +   1.8484       0.4586        4.03       <.0001 
Xi ,t-1*SIZE         +  -0.0279       0.0237       -1.18       0.2402 
Xi ,t-1*GROWTH       +   0.3803       0.1624        2.34       0.0197 
Xi ,t-1*LOSS        -  -1.2989       0.1318       -9.85       <.0001 
 
N=420  R-square = 0.5642
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Table 15 (Continued) 
Multivariate Analysis of Earnings Persistence & CFO Financial Expertise (Model 1) 
 Model: Xi,t  = β0 + β1 Xi ,t-1 + β2 Xi ,t-1*CPAit + β3 Xi ,t-1*MBAit + β4 Xi ,t-1*LENGTHit  
+ β5 Xi ,t-1*CFOAGEit +Β6 Xi ,t-1*BTEi,t + β7 Xi ,t-1*CAPi,t + β8 Xi ,t-1*SIZEi,t  
+ β9 Xi ,t-1*GROWTH,t + β10 Xi ,t-1*LOSS,t + Fixed Effects + εi,t 
Panel C: S&P 400 Firms
Indep. Var.  Expected Sign    Estimate         Std. Error     t Value     Pr > |t 
 
Intercept        ?  0.0142       0.0045        3.13       0.0019 
Xi ,t-1               +  0.3190       0.5448        0.59       0.5586 
Xi ,t-1*CPA          ?  0.0731       0.0544        1.35       0.1794 
Xi ,t-1*MBA         ?  -.0568       0.0603       -0.94       0.3471 
Xi ,t-1*LENGTH      ?  -.0045       0.0074       -0.60       0.5471 
Xi ,t-1*CFOAGE      ?  -.0016       0.0051       -0.31       0.7549 
Xi ,t-1*BTE          +  0.4394       0.1635        2.69       0.0076 
Xi ,t-1*CAP          +  -.4878       0.5135       -0.95       0.3429 
Xi ,t-1*SIZE         +  0.0847       0.0562        1.51       0.1325 
Xi ,t-1*GROWTH      +  -.2025       0.1354       -1.50       0.1356 
Xi ,t-1*LOSS        -  -.0617       0.1518       -0.41       0.6846 
 
N = 326 R-square= 0.6460                                       
Panel D: S&P 600 Firms
Indep. Var.  Expected Sign    Estimate         Std. Error     t Value     Pr > |t 
 
Intercept        ?  0.0082       0.0044        1.85       0.0645 
Xi ,t-1               +  0.6401       0.3746        1.71       0.0881 
Xi ,t-1*CPA          ?  0.0894       0.0575        1.55       0.1207 
Xi ,t-1*MBA         ?  -.1632       0.0679       -2.40       0.0166 
Xi ,t-1*LENGTH      ?  0.0103       0.0077        1.34       0.1821 
Xi ,t-1*CFOAGE      ?  -.0020       0.0047       -0.42       0.6730 
Xi ,t-1*BTE          +  -.6485       0.1436       -4.52       <.0001 
Xi ,t-1*CAP          +  -.3598       0.7182       -0.50       0.6165 
Xi ,t-1*SIZE         +  0.0144       0.0488        0.30       0.7675 
Xi ,t-1*GROWTH      +  0.5989       0.1003        5.97       <.0001 
Xi ,t-1*LOSS        -  -.4178       0.1189       -3.52       0.0005 
 
N=551  R-square = 0.4924
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Table 16 
Multivariate Analysis of Persistence & CFO Financial Expertise (Model 2-6) 
 Model: Xi,t  = β0 + β1 Xi ,t-1 + β2 Xi ,t-1*EXPERTISEit +Β6 Xi ,t-1*BTEi,t + β7Xi ,t-1*CAPi,t  
+ β8 Xi ,t-1*SIZEi,t + β9 Xi ,t-1*GROWTH,t + β10 Xi ,t-1*LOSS,t + Fixed Effects + εi,t 
 
 
Independent variables Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 3.48 3.45 3.44 3.46 3.77 
0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0002 
Xi ,t-1 
5.14 6.11 5.72 4.49 4.81 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Xi ,t-1*CPA 
2.2 - - - - 
0.0283 - - - - 
Xi ,t-1*MBA 
- -1.18 - - - 
- 0.2394 - - - 
Xi ,t-1*LENGTH 
- - 1 - - 
- - 0.3194 - - 
Xi ,t-1*CFOAGE 
- - - -0.99 -1.77 
- - - 0.3201 0.0764 
Xi ,t-1*EXPERT 
- - - - 3.16 
- - - - 0.0016 
Xi ,t-1*BTE 
-1.53 -1.5 -1.47 -1.51 -1.21 
0.1258 0.1329 0.1428 0.1304 0.2281 
Xi ,t-1*CAP 
4.47 4.43 4.53 4.35 4.30 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Xi ,t-1*SIZE 
2.94 2.71 2.54 2.66 3.14 
0.0033 0.0067 0.0112 0.0079 0.0039 
Xi ,t-1*GROWTH 
4.33 4.18 3.99 4.14 4.14 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Xi ,t-1*LOSS 
-9.07 -9.12 -9.1 -9.27 -8.99 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 17 
Multivariate Analysis of Conservatism and CFO Financial Expertise (Model 1) 
 
Xi/Pi,t-1 = α0 + α1DRi + β0Ri + β1Ri*DRi.  
 + γ0CPA + γ1CPA*DRi + γ2CPA* Ri + γ3CPA*Ri*DRi  
+ δ0MBA + δ1MBA*DRi + δ2MBA* Ri + δ3MBA*Ri*DRi   
+ φ0LENGTH + φ1LENGTH*DRi + φ2LENGTH* Ri + φ3LENGTH*Ri*DRi  
+µ0CFOAGE + µ1CFOAGE*DRi + µ2CFOAGE*Ri + µ3CFOAGE*R*DRi + νi,t  
 
Panel A: Pooled Regression (N = 1137)  R-square = 0.1159 
Independent  Expected  Estimate          Std Error     t Value     Pr > |t| 
Variables   Signs 
Intercept           ?  0.0047       0.0257        0.18       0.8547 
DR                  ?  -.0093       0.0498       -0.19       0.8513 
R                 +  0.1170       0.0546        2.14       0.0324 
R*DR              +  -.2093       0.2176       -0.96       0.3365 
CPA                 ?  -.0085       0.0061       -1.39       0.1652 
CPA*DR             ?  -.0142       0.0115       -1.23       0.2195 
CPA*R             ?  0.0115       0.0133        0.86       0.3899 
CPA*R*DR        ?  -.1015       0.0502       -2.02       0.0434 
MBA                 ?  0.0117       0.0061        1.93       0.0538 
MBA*DR             ?  0.0178       0.0118        1.51       0.1311 
MBA*R             ?  -.0445       0.0136       -3.28       0.0011 
MBA*R*DR         ?  0.2485       0.0532        4.67       <.0001 
LENGTH             ?  0.0003       0.0008        0.44       0.6617 
LENGTH*DR          ?  0.0018       0.0015        1.22       0.2230 
LENGTH*R         ?  -.0023       0.0016       -1.47       0.1426 
LENGTH*R*DR      ?  0.0066       0.0067         0.99       0.3214 
CFOAGE             ?  0.0008       0.0005         1.55       0.1208 
CFOAGE*DR          ?  -.0001       0.0010       -0.10       0.9173 
CFOAGE*R         ?  -.0016       0.0011       -1.26       0.2077 
CFOAGE*R*DR      ?  0.0042       0.0044         0.96       0.3378 
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Table 17 (Continued) 
Multivariate Analysis of Conservatism and CFO Financial Expertise (Model 1)  
 
Xi/Pi,t-1 = α0 + α1DRi + β0Ri + β1Ri*DRi.  
+ γ0CPA + γ1CPA*DRi + γ2CPA* Ri + γ3CPA*Ri*DRi  
+ δ0MBA + δ1MBA*DRi + δ2MBA* Ri + δ3MBA*Ri*DRi   
+ φ0LENGTH + φ1LENGTH*DRi + φ2LENGTH* Ri + φ3LENGTH*Ri*DRi  
+µ0CFOAGE + µ1CFOAGE*DRi + µ2CFOAGE*Ri + µ3CFOAGE*R*DRi + νi,t  
 
Panel B: S&P 500 Firms (N=353)  R-square = 0.1175                           
Independent  Expected  Estimate          Std Error     t Value     Pr > |t| 
Variables   Signs
 
Intercept           ?  0.0631       0.0596        1.06       0.2905 
DR                  ?  -.1114       0.1235       -0.90       0.3676 
R                 +  -.1560       0.1527       -1.02       0.3078 
R*DR              +  -.5153      0.7148       -0.72       0.4714 
CPA                 ?  -.0130       0.0140       -0.93       0.3544 
CPA*DR             ?  0.0027       0.0287        0.09       0.9257 
CPA*R             ?  0.0341       0.0376        0.91       0.3652 
CPA*R*DR         ?  -.0437       0.1648      -0.26       0.7912 
MBA                 ?  0.0170       0.0119        1.43       0.1546 
MBA*DR             ?  0.0452       0.0256        1.77       0.0776 
MBA*R             ?  -.0689       0.0325       -2.12       0.0347 
MBA*R*DR         ?  0.5073       0.1382        3.67       0.0003 
LENGTH             ?  0.0001       0.0015        0.07       0.9471 
LENGTH*DR          ?  0.0047       0.0036        1.30       0.1946 
LENGTH*R         ?  -.0025       0.0045       -0.55       0.5808 
LENGTH*R*DR      ?  0.0084       0.0182        0.46       0.6452 
CFOAGE             ?  -.0002       0.0011       -0.20       0.8397 
CFOAGE*DR          ?  0.0011       0.0024        0.45       0.6497 
CFOAGE*R         ?  0.0039       0.0029        1.35       0.1785 
CFOAGE*R*DR      ?  0.0067       0.0132        0.51       0.6101 
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Table 17 (Continued) 
Multivariate Analysis of Conservatism and CFO Financial Expertise (Model 1) 
 
Xi/Pi,t-1 = α0 + α1DRi + β0Ri + β1Ri*DRi.  
+ γ0CPA + γ1CPA*DRi + γ2CPA* Ri + γ3CPA*Ri*DRi  
+ δ0MBA + δ1MBA*DRi + δ2MBA* Ri + δ3MBA*Ri*DRi   
+ φ0LENGTH + φ1LENGTH*DRi + φ2LENGTH* Ri + φ3LENGTH*Ri*DRi  
+µ0CFOAGE + µ1CFOAGE*DRi + µ2CFOAGE*Ri + µ3CFOAGE*R*DRi + νi,t  
 
Panel C: S&P 400 Firms (N=302)  R-square = 0.0927 
Independent  Expected  Estimate           Std Error     t Value     Pr > |t| 
Variables   Signs 
Intercept           ?  0.0360      0.0387        0.93       0.3532 
DR                  ?  -.0515       0.0721      -0.71      0.4757 
R                 +  -.0137       0.0904       -0.15       0.8796 
R*DR              +  -.0768       0.4184       -0.18       0.8545 
CPA                 ?  -.0042       0.0092       -0.46       0.6464 
CPA*DR             ?  -.0057      0.0174       -0.33       0.7445 
CPA*R             ?  0.0223       0.0231        0.97       0.3340 
CPA*R*DR         ?  -.0929       0.0851       -1.09       0.2757 
MBA                 ?  -.0066       0.0101       -0.65       0.5137 
MBA*DR             ?  -.0028       0.0182       -0.15       0.8800 
MBA*R             ?  -.0063       0.0267       -0.24       0.8124 
MBA*R*DR         ?  -.0165       0.0866       -0.19       0.8494 
LENGTH             ?  -.0023       0.0013       -1.79       0.0751 
LENGTH*DR          ?  0.0042       0.0029        1.45       0.1472 
LENGTH*R         ?  0.0074       0.0028        2.66       0.0082 
LENGTH*R*DR      ?  -.0004       0.0168       -0.03       0.9799 
CFOAGE             ?  0.0006       0.0008        0.75       0.4512 
CFOAGE*DR          ?  0.0004       0.0014        0.26       0.7938 
CFOAGE*R         ?  -.0007       0.0019       -0.39       0.6932 
CFOAGE*R*DR      ?  0.0032       0.0084        0.38       0.7008 
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Table 17 (Continued) 
Multivariate Analysis of Conservatism and CFO Financial Expertise (Model 1) 
 
Xi/Pi,t-1 = α0 + α1DRi + β0Ri + β1Ri*DRi.  
+ γ0CPA + γ1CPA*DRi + γ2CPA* Ri + γ3CPA*Ri*DRi  
+ δ0MBA + δ1MBA*DRi + δ2MBA* Ri + δ3MBA*Ri*DRi   
+ φ0LENGTH + φ1LENGTH*DRi + φ2LENGTH* Ri + φ3LENGTH*Ri*DRi  
+µ0CFOAGE + µ1CFOAGE*DRi + µ2CFOAGE*Ri + µ3CFOAGE*R*DRi + νi,t  
 
Panel D: S&P 600 Firms (N=483)  R-square = 0.1953 
 
Independent  Expected  Estimate          Std Error     t Value     Pr > |t| 
Variables   Signs
 
Intercept           ?  -.0096       0.0404       -0.24       0.8128 
DR                  ?  0.0030       0.0802        0.04       0.9698 
R                 +  0.2177       0.0766        2.84       0.0047 
R*DR              +  -.2898       0.3036       -0.95       0.3403 
CPA                 ?  -.0134       0.0098       -1.37       0.1726 
CPA*DR             ?  -.0127       0.0184       -0.69       0.4928 
CPA*R             ?  0.0087       0.0188         0.46       0.6453 
CPA*R*DR         ?  -.0939       0.0728       -1.29       0.1975 
MBA                 ?  0.0182       0.0107        1.71       0.0874 
MBA*DR             ?  0.0059       0.0207        0.29       0.7753 
MBA*R             ?  -.0503       0.0192       -2.63       0.0089 
MBA*R*DR         ?  0.2467       0.0814        3.03       0.0026 
LENGTH             ?  0.0019       0.0013        1.48       0.1402 
LENGTH*DR          ?  -.0008       0.0021       -0.35       0.7236 
LENGTH*R         ?  -.0059       0.0023       -2.56       0.0106 
LENGTH*R*DR      ?  0.0070       0.0084        0.83       0.4075 
CFOAGE             ?  0.0009       0.0008        1.03       0.3014 
CFOAGE*DR          ?  0.0000       0.0016        0.02       0.9837 
CFOAGE*R         ?  -.00269       0.0015       -1.75       0.0811 
CFOAGE*R*DR      ?  0.0060       0.0061        0.97       0.3326 
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Table 18 
Multivariate Analysis of Conservatism and CFO Financial Expertise 
 
Xi/Pi,t-1 = α0 + α1DRi + β0Ri + β1Ri*DRi. + γ0EXPERTISE + γ1EXPERTISE*DRi  
+ γ2EXPERTISE* Ri + γ3EXPERTISE*Ri*DRi + νi,t  
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 14.98 <.0001 - - - - - - - - 
DR 0.46 0.6435 - - - - - - - - 
R 0.79 0.429 - - - - - - - - 
R*DR 4.58 <.0001 - - - - - - - - 
CPA -2.2 0.0277 - - - - - - - - 
CPA*DR -1.47 0.1413 - - - - - - - - 
CPA*R 1.99 0.0473 - - - - - - - - 
CPA*R*DR -2.9 0.0038 - - - - - - - - 
Intercept - - 11.55 <.0001 - - - - - - 
DR - - -1.24 0.2142 - - - - - - 
R - - 4.63 <.0001 - - - - - - 
DR*R - - 0 0.9988 - - - - - - 
MBA - - 2.66 0.0078 - - - - - - 
MBA*DR - - 1.52 0.1295 - - - - - - 
MBA*R - - -3.98 <.0001 - - - - - - 
MBA*R*DR - - 5.09 <.0001 - - - - - - 
Intercept - - - - 7.59 <.0001 - - - - 
DR - - - - -1.54 0.1239 - - - - 
R - - - - 3.08 0.0021 - - - - 
DR*R - - - - 0.68 0.4971 - - - - 
LENGTH - - - - 1.12 0.2621 - - - - 
LENGTH*DR - - - - 1.25 0.211 - - - - 
LENGTH*R - - - - -1.95 0.0519 - - - - 
LENGTH*R*DR - - - - 1.16 0.2448 - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Intercept - - - - - - -0.6 0.5481 - - 
DR - - - - - - -0.48 0.6328 - - 
R - - - - - - 3.35 0.0008 - - 
DR*R - - - - - - -1.78 0.0751 - - 
CFOAGE - - - - - - 2.63 0.0087 - - 
CFOAGE*DR - - - - - - 0.4 0.6868 - - 
CFOAGE*R - - - - - - -3.03 0.0025 - - 
CFOAGE*R*DR - - - - - - 2.18 0.0293 - - 
Intercept - - - - - - - - 16.59 <.0001 
DR - - - - - - - - -1.06 0.2888 
R - - - - - - - - 2.61 0.0093 
DR*R - - - - - - - - 3.04 0.0024 
EXPERT - - - - - - - - -0.4 0.691 
DR*EXPERT - - - - - - - - 1.15 0.2519 
R*EXPERT - - - - - - - - 0.11 0.9134 
DR*R*EXPERT - - - - - - - - 1.52 0.1277 
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Table 19 
Multivariate Analysis of Earnings Informativeness and CFO Financial Expertise 
 
Model: RETit = δ0 + δ1NIit + δ2NIit*CPAit + δ3NIit*MBAit + δ4NIit*LENGTHit + δ5NIit* 
CFOAGEit + δ6NIit* SIZEit + δ7NIit*LEVit + δ8NIit*MBit + Fixed effects + εit  
 
Panel A: Pooled Regression  
Independent  Expected  Estimate           Std Error     t Value     Pr > |t| 
Variables   Signs 
Intercept       ?  -0.0248       0.0197       -1.26       0.2087 
NI              +    8.3568       1.4472         5.77       <.0001 
NI*CPA          ?    0.4958       0.2552         1.94       0.0522 
NI*MBA          ?   -0.4932       0.2515       -1.96       0.0501 
NI*LENGTH      ?  -0.0189       0.0316       -0.60       0.5495 
NI*CFOAGE      ?   0.0164       0.0228          0.72       0.4714 
NI*SIZE         -  -0.3822       0.1051       -3.64       0.0003 
NI*BM           -  -3.2310       0.5655       -5.71       <.0001 
NI*LEV          -  -2.0334       0.8006       -2.54       0.0112 
NI*AUD          +  -1.0854       0.7093       -1.53       0.1262 
NI*LOSS         -  -2.5546       0.5179       -4.93       <.0001 
 
N=1312  R-square=0.1517  
 
Panel B: S&P 500 Firms                            
Independent  Expected  Estimate           Std Error     t Value     Pr > |t| 
Variables   Signs
Intercept       ?  -0.0112       0.0340       -0.33       0.7419 
NI              +   6.9925       3.7447         1.87       0.0626 
NI*CPA          ?   0.9690       0.4882         1.98       0.0479 
NI*MBA          ?   0.0634       0.4150         0.15       0.8787 
NI*LENGTH      ?  -0.1007       0.0554       -1.82       0.0697 
NI*CFOAGE      ?   0.0209       0.0407         0.51       0.6068 
NI*SIZE         -  -0.2385       0.2000       -1.19       0.2338 
NI*BM           -  -4.4765       1.1783       -3.80       0.0002 
NI*LEV          -  -4.4884       1.3817       -3.25       0.0013 
NI*AUD          +   1.0534       2.5410          0.41       0.6787 
NI*LOSS         -  -2.5440       1.2578       -2.02       0.0438 
 
N = 421  R-square = 0.1571 
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Table 19 (Continued) 
Multivariate Analysis of Earnings Informativeness & CFO Financial Expertise 
 
Model: RETit = δ0 + δ1NIit + δ2NIit*CPAit + δ3NIit*MBAit + δ4NIit*LENGTHit + δ5NIit* 
CFOAGEit + δ6NIit* SIZEit + δ7NIit*LEVit + δ8NIit*MBit + Fixed effects + εit  
 
Panel C: S&P 400 Firms 
Independent  Expected  Estimate           Std Error     t Value     Pr > |t| 
Variables   Signs 
Intercept       ?  -0.0402       0.0423       -0.95       0.3428 
NI              +   3.6933       4.3024         0.86       0.3913 
NI*CPA          ?  -0.1719       0.5362       -0.32       0.7487 
NI*MBA          ?  -0.8499       0.6184       -1.37       0.1703 
NI*LENGTH     ?   0.0139       0.0677         0.20       0.8378 
NI*CFOAGE     ?   0.0445       0.0494         0.90       0.3686 
NI*SIZE         -   0.2892       0.4931         0.59       0.5579 
NI*BM           -  -5.4627       1.7439       -3.13       0.0019 
NI*LEV          -  -2.5444       1.7464       -1.46       0.1461 
NI*AUD          +  -1.9760       1.6574       -1.19       0.2340 
NI*LOSS         -  -3.4609       1.1898       -2.91       0.0039 
 
N=341  R-square=0.1345 
 
Panel C: S&P 600 Firms  
 
Independent  Expected  Estimate           Std Error     t Value     Pr > |t| 
Variables   Signs
 
Intercept       ?  -0.0341       0.0332       -1.03       0.3042 
NI              +   9.3335       2.5775          3.62       0.0003 
NI*CPA          ?   0.7291       0.4169          1.75       0.0809 
NI*MBA          ?  -1.0178       0.4422       -2.30       0.0218 
NI*LENGTH      ?  -0.0184       0.0530       -0.35       0.7288 
NI*CFOAGE      ?   0.0059       0.0368         0.16       0.8720 
NI*SIZE         -  -0.5113       0.3398       -1.50       0.1329 
NI*BM           -  -3.3445       0.9224       -3.63       0.0003 
NI*LEV          -  -0.8216       1.5188       -0.54       0.5888 
NI*AUD          +  -1.0607       0.9386       -1.13       0.2590 
NI*LOSS         -  -2.4826       0.9224       -2.69       0.0073 
 
N=550  R-square = 0.1920 
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Table 20 
Multivariate Analysis of Informativeness & CFO Financial Expertise (Model 2-6) 
 
Model: RETit = δ0 + δ1NIit + δ2NIit*Expertiseit +  δ3NIit* SIZEit + δ4NIit*LEVit  
+ δ5NIit*MBit + Fixed effects + εit    
 
Pooled Regression  
Independent Expected  Model 2    Model 3      Model 4    Model 5    Model 6 
Variables  Signs 
 
Intercept ? -1.26 -1.24 -1.28 -1.28 -1.37 
0.2063 0.2153 0.2 0.2008 0.1722 
NI + 8.62 9.29 9.2 6.76 6.80 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
NI*CPA ? 1.98 - - - - 
0.0483 - - - - 
NI* MBA ? - -1.96 - - - 
- 0.0507 - - - 
NI*LENGTH ? - - -0.32 - - 
- - 0.7477 - - 
NI*CFOAGE ? - - - 0.17 0.27 
- - - 0.8659 0.7899 
NI*EXPERT ? - - - - -1.80 
- - - - 0.0714 
NI*SIZE - -3.83 -4.08 -4.38 -4.35 -4.53 
0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
NI*BM - -5.7 -5.64 -5.62 -5.63 -5.48 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
NI*LEV - -2.63 -2.3 -2.43 -2.43 -2.36 
0.0085 0.0215 0.0152 0.015 0.0185 
NI*AUD + -1.54 -1.62 -1.68 -1.65 -1.65 
0.1244 0.1053 0.0926 0.0984 0.0995 
NI*LOSS - -5.08 -5.14 -5.21 -5.11 -5.27 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 21  
Summary of the Multivariate Regression Analyses on the Association between 
Earnings Quality and CFO Financial Expertise 
 
VARIABLES CPA MBA LENGTH AGE EXPERT 
Accruals Quality:   
Overall NS NS NS NS NS 
S&P 500 NS NS NS + N/A 
S&P 400 NS NS + NS N/A 
S&P 600 NS NS NS NS N/A 
  
Persistence:   
Overall + NS NS NS + 
S&P 500 NS NS NS NS N/A 
S&P 400 NS NS NS NS N/A 
S&P 600 NS - NS NS N/A 
  
Conservatism:   
Overall - + NS NS NS 
S&P 500 NS + NS NS N/A 
S&P 400 NS NS - NS N/A 
S&P 600 NS + + + N/A 
  
Informativeness:   
Overall + - NS NS - 
S&P 500 + NS - NS N/A 
S&P 400 NS NS NS NS N/A 
S&P 600 + - NS NS N/A 
 
Notes: 
These are the results based on equations [2], [4], [6], and [8] presented in Chapter 3.  
 
NS  = no significant association between earnings quality and CFO financial expertise 
+   = a positive association between earnings quality and CFO financial expertise 
- = a negative association between earnings quality and CFO financial expertise.  
N/A = not available
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Appendix A. List of Firms in the Initial Sample 
 
Panel A: By Industry Classification   
No.  
SIC 
Codes Industry # of Firms 
1. 07 Agricultural Services 1 
2. 10 Metal Mining 3 
3. 12 Coal Mining 3 
4. 13 Oil and Gas Extraction 44 
5. 14 Nonmetallic Minerals (except fuels) 4 
6. 15 General Building Contractors 14 
7. 16 Heavy Construction, Ex. Building 4 
8. 17 Special Trade Contractors 3 
9. 20 Food and Kindred 36 
10. 21 Tobacco Products 3 
11. 22 Textile Mill Products 3 
12. 23 Apparel & Other Textile Products 11 
13. 24 Lumber & Wood Products 8 
14. 25 Furniture & Allied Products 10 
15. 26 Paper & Allied Products 23 
16. 27 Printing and Publishing 23 
17. 28 Chemicals and Allied Products 96 
18. 29 Petroleum and Coal Products 13 
19. 30 Rubber & Misc. Plastic Products 12 
20. 31 Leather and Leather Products 6 
21. 32 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 6 
22. 33 Primary Metal Industries 24 
23. 34 Fabricated Metal Products 19 
24. 35 Industrial Machinery Equipment 77 
25. 36 Electronic & Other Electronic Equipment 120 
26. 37 Transportation Equipment 41 
27. 38 Instruments & Related Products 83 
28. 39 Misc. Manufacturing Industries 13 
29. 50 Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 35 
30. 51 Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 12 
31. 52 Building Materials & Garden Supplies 4 
32. 53 General Merchandise Stores 15 
33. 54 Foods Stores 6 
34. 55 Automotive Dealers & Service Stations 9 
35. 56 Apparel & Accessory Stores 27 
36. 57 Furniture & Home Furnishings Stores 10 
37. 58 Eating & Drinking Places 24 
38. 59 Misc. Retail 23 
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Appendix A. List of Firms in the Sample (Continued) 
 
Panel A: By Industry Classification   
No.    Industry # of Firms 
39. 70 Hotel & Other Lodging Places 3 
40. 72 Personal Services 5 
41. 73 Business Services 135 
42. 75 Auto Repair, Services, and Parking 4 
43. 78 Motion Pictures 3 
44. 79 Amusement & Recreation Services 9 
45. 80 Health Services 24 
46. 82 Educational Services 7 
47. 83 Social Services 1 
48. 87 Engineering & Management Services 18 
49. 99 Miscellaneous 4 
Total 1,081 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: By S&P Classification  
No. S&P Classification   # of Unique Firms Percentage 
1. S&P 500 Firms 348 32% 
2. S&P 400 Firms 282 26% 
3. S&P 600 Firms 451 42% 
Total 1,081 100% 
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APPENDIX B. List of Academic Institutions where CFOs among S&P 1500 Firms 
Attended And Obtained their Advanced Degree in Business 
            
No.  Name of the Institutions # of CFOs No. Name of the Institutions # of CFOs 
1. University of Chicago 34 36. Georgia State University 3 
2. Harvard University 34 37. University of Kansas 3 
3. University of Pennsylvania 30 38. Lehigh University 3 
4. Northwestern University 26 39. Marquette University 3 
5. University of Michigan 12 40. Penn State University 3 
6. USC 12 41. Rutgers University 3 
7. Columbia University 11 42. SMU 3 
8. Stanford University 11 43. Tulane University 3 
9. University of Virginia 10 44. UC Berkeley 3 
10. Dartmouth College 8 45. University of Washington 3 
11. UCLA 8 46. University of Akron 2 
12. Duke University 7 47. University of Arizona 2 
13. New York University 7 48. Arizona State University 2 
14. Santa Clara University 7 49. Cal State University 2 
15. MIT 6 50. Carnegie Mellon University 2 
16. Ohio State University 6 51. University of Cincinnati 2 
17. Cornell University 5 52. University of Colorado 2 
18. Golden Gate University 5 53. University of Connecticut 2 
19. Michigan State University 5 54. University of Denver 2 
20. University of Texas Austin 5 55. Drexel University 2 
21. University of North Carolina 5 56. Emory University 2 
22. Babson College 4 57. Fordham University 2 
23. Boston University 4 58. George Mason University 2 
24. Case Western Reserve 4 59. University of Houston 2 
25. University of Illinois 4 60. Indian Institute of Mgmt 2 
26. Indiana University 4 61. University of Iowa 2 
27. University of Minnesota 4 62. University of Kentucky 2 
28. Northeastern University 4 63. Loyola University Chicago 2 
29. Pittsburgh University 4 64. Northern Illinois University 2 
30. Vanderbilt University 4 65. University of Notre Dame 2 
31. University of Wisconsin 4 66. Pepperdine University 2 
32. Xavier University 4 67. Rice University 2 
33. Brigham Young University 3 68. University of St. Thomas 2 
34. DePaul University 3 69. SUNY 2 
35. University of Detroit 3 70. Syracuse University 2 
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APPENDIX B. List of Academic Institutions where CFOs among S&P 1500 Firms 
Attended And Obtained their Advanced Degree in Business (Continued) 
            
No. Name of Institutions # of CFOs No. Name of Institutions # of CFOs 
71. Texas A&M University 2 107. NYE 1 
72. Thunderbird University 2 108. University of Ohio 1 
73. University of Utah 2 109. University of Oklahoma 1 
74. Virginia Commonwealth 2 110. Passau, Germany 1 
75. Yale University 2 111. University of Providence 1 
76. Aberdeen University 1 112. University of Rochester 1 
77. Adelphi University 1 113. Roosevelt University 1 
78. American U. 1 114. Saginaw Valley St. Coll. 1 
79. Baldwin Wallace 1 115. Saint Mary Coll. 1 
80. Bentley College 1 116. San Jose University 1 
81. Bowling Green St. 1 117. Seattle University 1 
82. Bryant University 1 118. Seton Hall University 1 
83. Carolina Greensboro 1 119. South Dakota 1 
84. Catholic U. of America 1 120. Southern Illinois 1 
85. Claremont Grad Sch. 1 121. St. John's U. 1 
86. Clemson University 1 122. St. Louis 1 
87. Coll. William & Mary 1 123. Stanford/Vanderbilt 1 
88. Ctrl. State U. Oklahoma 1 124. Stetson University 1 
89. University of Dayton 1 125. Stevens Inst. Of Tech 1 
90. Drucker School of Mgmt 1 126. Suffolk University 1 
91. Eastern College 1 127. SUNY Albany 1 
92. Farleigh Dickinson Univ. 1 128. University of Tennessee 1 
93. Florida Atlantic University 1 129. TN at Chattanooga 1 
94. Florida, Gainesville 1 130. University of Toronto 1 
95. Georgetown University 1 131. University of Tulsa 1 
96. Harvard Coll. 1 132. UNC, Charlotte 1 
97. Houston Baptist 1 133. UNC, Wilmington 1 
98. Indianapolis 1 134. Union Coll. 1 
99. Louisiana Tech. University 1 135. Virginia Tech University 1 
100. Loyola University 1 136. Washington, St. Louis 1 
101. Loyola Coll. 1 137. Wisconsin at Eau Claire 1 
102. University of Massachusetts 1 138. Unknown 6 
103. Univ. of Miami 1 Total 465 
104. Univ. of Nebraska 1 
105. Univ. of Nebraska, Omaha 1 
106. Univ. of Nevada, Reno 1    
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